Saturday February 28th

(W)77 - 51

11 points | 5 rebounds | 1 assists | 1 turnover

57.1% 2pt (4-7) | 50% 3pt (1-2) | FT% (0-0)

61% TS | 0.00 FTr | 0.222 3PAr

0 steals | 0 blocks

A subtle, modest prospect in contrast to the several others of this class who’ve set program scoring records, assist records, three-point records, Ngongba manages to shine in the in-between, the connective activities that coalesce an intricate machine. It is akin to power steering in a vehicle: a technology that allows for simple, effortless steering on behalf of the driver, its effectiveness unmistakable especially in heavy, large vehicles like SUVs. It is not a precondition to building a functional car. It is not the driver, the engine, nor the exhaust. However, the ease of driving achieved with power steering has metamorphosed the technology to becoming integral to every car on the market today. Ngongba isn’t a precondition to building the best team in the nation. He isn’t a do-it-all blue-chip freshman prodigy like Cameron Boozer, nor is he a two-way veteran upperclassman like Maliq Brown. Though, the ease and depth in which Duke can execute their offense, can fortify their defense with Ngongba integrated into their roster, has made him integral to the Blue Devils dominant success.

Duke’s blowout win versus the eleventh nationally ranked Virginia Cavaliers embodies this spectacle of dominant success, Virginia, 26-3 and 14-2 in conference play. This was Virginia’s first game of the season held under 70 points in a loss, their third game this season scoring under 70 points. The Blue Devils execute impeccable defensive schemes collectively, with defensive specialists Dame Sarr, Maliq Brown at the wing, Patrick Ngongba at center, flanked by Cameron Boozer and Caleb Foster. Ngongba, as Duke’s sole big—no other active player on the roster measuring 6’10 or taller—is invariably engaged with switching, tagging, rotating, containing, and rim-protection. With vast responsibilities, ever-changing within a single possession, it’s Ngongba’s perpetual activity that produces stops, enables teammates off-ball to dig for steals, and generates open-floor possessions. This “activity” isn’t recorded on the box score, rather, it is reflected in Duke’s defensive adjusted-efficiency, ranked number-one in the nation per Bart Torvik. First defensive possession for Duke, Virginia fast in transition capitalizing on a Dame Sarr turnover, Virginia guard Malik Thomas middle lane fervently looking for an open shooter against the unset scrambling Duke defense. Thomas shovels the ball to the trailing Johann Grünloh, who Boozer successfully deters from shooting, Thomas subsequently flaring out to the wing as Duke’s defense still scrambled. Ngongba immediately spots Thomas’ activity, rushing out the paint to contain the 6’4 guard at the three-point line, by which Thomas responds with a hard drive to the rim. Ngongba gets beat on the drive, Isaiah Evans is forced to rotate weakside corner to defend the rim, and as Thomas appropriately responds to this rotation with a weakside kickout to the wide-open Thijs De Ridder at wing, Ngongba reappears in the possession, jutting out from the opposite nail to contest the three, pressuring Thijs De Ridder into a miss. It’s not a perfect possession from Ngongba, he’s beat on the initial closeout, but it’s his initiative, an inner fuel that pushes him to show up twice to consequentially hinder Virginia’s shooters. The possession continued, Virginia nabbing the offensive rebound, Duke’s defense now set, and Ngongba subsequently drawn into a pick-and-roll. Ngongba, as the screen-defender, covers at-the-level, successfully driving the ball-handler wide from the right wing to the corner, cooly sliding his feet to match the pace of the ball-handler. Once the point-of-attack (POA) Caleb Foster recovered to the ball-handler, Ngongba seamlessly rotated back to the screener-big in the low post and immediately worked to deny any potential entry pass with a physical box-out. Virginia, with their initial pick-and-roll killed, Malik Thomas triggers another pick-and-roll top of the key, Ngongba again covering. But with only six seconds left on the clock, Thomas throws up a long-two, misses, Sarr recovers the ball, and Virginia’s extended possession ends fruitless. Near perfect team execution from Duke, the surety of shutting down Virginia derived directly from Ngongba. This application of defensive intuition flows all through the succeeding possessions from Ngongba. Consistent, sharp switches and rotations, denying actions by an incessant presence.

Ngongba’s defensive utility wanes on the perimeter, its weakest in possessions to which he’s switched onto a guard. Both premier guards for Virginia Malik Thomas and Chance Mallory found success generating clean blow-bys against Ngongba, Ngongba unable to contain the two from turning the corner, their downhill speed too fast, their frame/size too pliant for him to contain laterally. Ngongba bodes better against wing-size or greater ball-handlers, utilizing his shoulders and upper body to inhibit their drives. Ngongba’s shoulder activity jams a 6’8 wing’s movement, for instance, whereas a 6’4 guard can avoid the jam entirely. A rarity it is for centers, including the all-time defensive prospects—Evan Mobley, Chet Holmgren, Donovan Clingan, Victor Wembanyama—to effectively defend on the perimeter by themselves. While they can demonstrate utility in spurts, Wemby and Chet the best of this group due to their recovery talent (tall plus long wingspan plus near instant court mapping/processing equals chase-down blocks), these perennial defensive-player-of-the-year bigs are often situated at the dunker spot to offer weakside rim-protection/deterrence. For Ngongba, this means poor perimeter containment isn’t indicative of his defensive projections in the NBA, his interior deterrence, switch-activity more essential to contemporary defensive schemes. Ngongba shut down Virginia’s post-bigs and pick-and-roll ball-handlers, stifling dribble-penetration around screens, his physicality and Duke’s synchronous help-defense hindering paint touches. Ngongba, defending at-the-level to the screen, committed to containing the ball-handler, struggled switching back to the slipping screener once his POA recovered, to then contest at-the-rim. It’s a faculty of Wembey, Chet, etc. that differentiates them as top-percentile defenders. Ngongba’s moderate block-rate quantifies this weakness, the shortage of defensive playmaking, zero blocks or steals against Virginia, grows to an acute vulnerability of Ngongba in all of his efficacy as a ground-level defender.

Ngongba’s rebounding-rate and box-score numbers underrate his rebounding talent: an astutely active, physical rebounder, confident and assertive in the timing, execution of his jumps, shows great extension of length when reaching out to the ball, and authoritarian in possession. Ngongba proved his ability to win contested, physical rebounds, every board versus Virginia, a battle of positioning, of energy, attrition. In his first defensive rebound of the game, just midway through the first half, Malik Thomas fires off a quick three from a hand-off at the left-wing, Patrick Ngongba the sole player in the paint. Rather than absent-mindedly spectating the outcome of Thomas’ three-ball, Ngongba turns away from the basket, pinpointing the lurking Virginia big, Johann Grünloh, who would also be crashing the paint for the potential rebound. Locating Grünloh, Ngongba immediately gets to pressuring him out the paint, and even with the missed three by Thomas bouncing out in the favor to Grünloh, it’s descent directed to his outstretched palm, Ngongba stays in the mix, Grünloh off-balance in a clash of strength against Ngongba, Ngongba with the forward momentum, jumps and intercepts the ball, denying Virginia an extra possession.

With eleven points, Ngongba finished third in scoring for the Blue Devils, behind leading scorer Isaiah Evans and close second Cameron Boozer. Akin to their season averages, Boozer leads the team in possessions, Evans three-point attempts, and Ngongba rewarded as the sole cutting/rolling/dunker big on the roster. Ngongba primarily occupied either dunker spot or top of the key, functioning as a roller in pick-and-roll action or handoffs up top, and as a vertical spacer/lob threat down low. Versus Virginia, these designations enable Ngongba as a release valve, a bail out option of sorts for ball-handlers faced against shrinking defensive coverages. Rather than slow halfcourt pace with Ngongba setting a multitude of screens for Caleb Foster, Cayden Boozer, and Isaiah Evans, all three second-rate off-the-dribble scorers, a high pick-and-roll demanding articulate ball-control and shot-making ability, the three guards enter screening action with Ngongba mainly through handoffs. It allows Foster and Boozer to take the ball and turn downhill without disrupting momentum nor burdened with generating the momentum on-ball, facing the defense. Simultaneously, Ngongba, director of the handoff, orchestrates the angles and timing of the action, thereupon slipping to the basket, available behind the defense at the dunker spot, awaiting the lob. The advantage of these handoffs lie in Ngongba’s discernment. It is left to the sophomore when and how the handoff is disseminated, which therein simplifies the function of Duke’s guards. It is a degree of live-dribble, read-and-react competence by Ngongba, within an action or away, that elevates a halfcourt offense, despite not being a “spacer”.

Saturday February 21st

(L)94 - 95 (OT)

19 points | 8 rebounds | 6 assists | 2 turnovers

44.4% 2pt (4-9) | 16.7% 3pt (1-6) | 100 FT% (8-8)

51% TS | .533 FTr | 0.400 3PAr

1 steal | 2 blocks

Concurrent with the rise in his draft rises a wave of doubters in Keaton Wagler’s ability to translate his strong freshman season at Illinois to the NBA. His performance against UCLA offers corroboration to both sides of the debate—Wagler maintaining his great influence on Illinois’ offense amid a poor shooting night, whilst demonstrating the consequences of a grievously limited athletic profile that’s limitations inevitably exacerbate at the NBA level.

Versus UCLA, Wagler was without his greatest asset, his three-point shot, shooting only one-of-six from beyond the stripe. His sole three, his very first attempt of the game and Illinois’ first point of the night—initiated with a strong right jab off-the-catch, into a right-left cross pull-up jumper. A simple, basic shot sequence, exemplifying the comfort and fluency of Wagler’s shot preparation and subsequent mechanics: an efficient, swift, one-dribble maneuver to generate a window of space against a hounding UCLA close-out. Wagler’s succeeding threes, one catch-and-shoot, the remaining four off-the-dribble through pick-and-roll (PnR)/isolation possessions, were misses that could be chalked to misfortune rather than a “bad shot”, “rushed shot”, or a product of missed reads, negligence to the team. The catch-and-shoot, wide open, Wagler missed front rim. The pick-and-roll possessions, similarly dribble-efficient sequences to his made spot-up three at the start of this game, slowly approaching the high PnR before skipping (literally) into a change a pace (a clever feint Wagler utilizes to show “downhill” before changing direction east-west, or west-east, with a hard one-dribble tween, cross, or behind-the-back, immediately into a pull-up, spacing successfully generated). These aren’t poor quality shots. They require minimal shot-clock burn for Wagler to execute, and as a 41.4% 3pt shooter off-the-dribble, and better PnR shooter at 45.0% 3pt for the season (twenty-eight games and counting), these shots are encouraged, as one of Illinois’ (ranked number-one in adjusted offensive efficiency in the country per Barttorvik) strongest models of offense. Noted is the distance of each of these missed threes, or rather, Wagler’s shot profile from three overall, consistently firing off shots comfortably a ways back from the collegiate three-point line, an additive to his three-point ability. Unnerved by shooting distance, Wagler obliges defenders to wander out several feet beyond the three-point line, stressing the tether to their help-defense.

Juxtaposed by the “outlier”, “off-night” of Wagler’s poor three-point showing versus UCLA, is the consistency of an ordeal: Wagler’s two-point efficiency, or lack thereof. Measured unofficially at 6’6 with shoes, Wagler is shooting 49.1% 2pt, marking below-average and the lowest two-point efficiency amongst prominent freshman guard counterparts (Acuff, Peterson, Flemings, Brown Jr.,). Wagler isn’t fully distinct in this matter: Mikel Brown Jr. just crosses the 50% 2pt threshold, at 50.5%, Flemings in at 51.5%. In fact, per Barttorvik, Flemings and Wagler have identical splits at-the-rim, ~60%. The concern with Wagler nonetheless persists. Historically, 6’6-approximate prospects who shoot below 50% from two-point range, specifically those without the substantial shot diet of middys, offer negligible contributions in the league offensively, if not a net-negative return year-over-year (Kelly Oubre, Quentin Grimes, Lonnie Walker IV for instance). Wagler is indeed a poor midrange, non-rim two-point scorer, converting just 32.3% per Bart. Though in the case of Wagler, these non-rim twos should not drag his two-point efficiency in the manner it currently is, given its moderate volume. This suggests Wagler has an ordeal of a rim volume deficit. And parsing through his play types, it is specifically an issue of self-generating transition offense. Through 28 games, Wagler has just 25 possessions in transition, averaging 0.9 per game. In contrast, Flemings totals to 65. Acuff, 115. Peterson, in 17 games, 40 possessions. Mikel Brown Jr., 66 possessions in 20 games. UCLA marked Wagler’s fourth-straight game without a possession in transition, translating to zero opportunities for Wagler to cash in points in the open floor. Where his counterparts have bolstered their two-point efficiency in the open-court, Wagler has entrenched himself in the halfcourt, reliant on dribble-penetration and conniving finishing angles to manufacture shots at-the-rim. Conniving, however difficult. Wagler’s first recorded rim-attempt versus UCLA, an iso at the left wing, Wagler initially blowing by his defender with a swift right-left tween into an off-hand drive, forced to pick up his dribble just outside the hash marks as the low-man rotates up to steal the ball unsuccessfully, and, with Wagler in no-man’s-land, he opts for a step-through inside-hand lay off the glass, which rims out. A clean, creative sequence given the spacing and shot clock against his favor. Yet it is the manner of his finish that concerns. Wagler scarcely generates lift following his step-through, his finishing arm arguably the sole extremity activated in the layup attempt, solely dependent on the finesse of his touch to finish, rather than his entire body, his athleticism. Wagler’s second miss of the night, another iso possession, another possession in which he wins his defender from parallel to his body to his side (perpendicular to his shoulder). Still, as he picks up his dribble at the free-throw line, Wagler is easily pressed off his line by the sideways defender, Tyler Bilodeau, and with a massive gathering step attempting to regain balance, tries his left-side inside finish again, his right arm once more the sole extremity activated on the finish, and is promptly blocked off the low end of the glass by Tyler Bilodeau. His third miss is all but similar, once more blocked at the rim, his feet scarcely leaving the ground for the finish. Wagler’s on-ball makes (PnR or iso possessions) are consistent with his misses, against UCLA leveraging the basket as a safeguard against his POA with an opposite-side finish, still, his finishing arm doing most of the work in the execution. How this low margin for error, finesse-dependent finishing technique translates to the NBA is very uncertain. Exacerbated by the absence of transition offense, the margins increasingly narrow. A high free-throw rate for the season maintained versus UCLA, though, it’s uncertain this rate of foul-drawing can be sustained in the NBA. The fouls Wagler generated this game were a byproduct of him meeting illegal contact in the paint, not artistically drawing the foul through power akin to Dybantsa, or Mikel Brown Jr., in which it would appear to a referee that the defender committed a shooting foul as an inevitability to prevent the basket. Power in the NBA is derived by strength, speed, and/or a combination of both athletic traits. Neither of which Wagler possesses. Historically, high free-throw rate 6’6 approximate prospects with exceptionally low dunk attempts are for one, rare, and secondly, fail to translate their free-throw rate success from NCAA to NBA.

Wagler’s six assists versus UCLA asserts his function as a facilitator, Illinois’ offense established predominantly through ball-screens, Wagler as chief conductor. By Head Coach Brad Underwood and Offensive Coordinator Tyler Underwood’s design, these ball-screens, no matter the iteration (High PnR, Spain, Horns, etc.) are accompanied by a backline motion of some sort: backdoor cuts, flex actions, baseline cuts, the roller of a side PnR clearing to the opposite corner into a corner pin. This weakens the defense’s ability to tag or fortify rim protection, while enabling offensively continuous rim-pressure with cutting above-the-rim play-finishers or using the roller. Wagler is typically armed with both cutter and roller simultaneously. What intrigues with Wagler’s playmaking versus UCLA is his tenacity for producing dribble penetration, which draws in the low-man—the trigger for big Zvonimir Ivisic to cut to the rim unguarded for the lob dunk. It is once more Keaton Wagler utilizing dribble-efficient sequences to generate positional advantages against his POA, driving hard downhill with the defender at his side, that inevitably draws in the low man, in most possessions the defense’s sole rim protector. Wagler extends this production of dribble penetration beyond ball-screens possessions, generating multiple paint touches in isolation versus UCLA, drawing in the help and subsequently kicking out to his corner shooters, to which his teammates were unable to cash in.

Monday February 9th

(W)118 - 77

45 points | 9 rebounds | 2 assists | 2 turnovers

57.1% 2pt (4-7) | 62.5% 3pt (10-16) | 100 FT% (7-7)

86% TS | .304 FTr | 0.696 3PAr

3 steals | 0 block

A capricious stint of play upon returning from a lingering lower-back injury that left him sidelined much of December and January, Mikel Brown Jr. delivered the long-awaited breakout game Monday with a superstar stat-line against ACC opponent NC State. A wholly disappointing performance on the road against Duke just two weeks beforehand, a mere seven points shooting zero of six from two, one of seven from deep, sowed strong doubts into Brown’s health and ability, as Duke comfortably ran the floor with Brown on both ends of the floor. Two subsequent games, against Notre Dame and Wake Forest, significantly weaker opponents than the Blue Devils, exacerbated these doubts, as Brown shooting struggles prolonged, struggling to find his rhythm, scoring six and twelve points respectively on poor shooting splits.

Mikel Brown Jr's NC State game, was, for all intents and purposes, a breakout game. A breakout of a significant shooting slump, breaking out of poor defensive episodes, and a return to the alluring, confident style of play that placed him squarely in the top ten of a decorated class early in the cycle.

There are a handful of qualities highlighted in this game that make up Mikel Brown Jr in the grand scheme, framing the point guard in distinct light from his prominent contemporaries, Darius Acuff, Kingston Flemings, even Labaron Philon. Amongst this cohort, a forty-point plus explosion is within the expected, though the details of how Brown achieved this feat is what will define him as the stronger prospect by end of cycle. Beginning with perimeter shooting.

Brown attempted sixteen threes total against NC State, cashing ten, his three-point attempt rate (the ratio of three-point attempts to field-goal-attempts) significantly higher than that of his counterparts. Looking ahead at the modern NBA guard, the fashion in which they generate points (Tyrese Maxey, Donovan Mitchell, Anthony Edwards, Austin Reaves, Luka Doncic, Jamal Murray), the strongest commonality between the varied-sized guards, notwithstanding varied athletic prowess, is their three-point volume. The ability to shoot heaps of three-pointers, off-the-dribble and catch-and-shoots, in isolation or through the pick-and-roll, potentially off-screen or at the corner, an integral facet of winning (impactful) NBA guards. Brown versus NC State demonstrated this ability in full: Off-ball relocation threes from the corner, mixed with deep pull-up threes at the top of the key; transition catch-and-shoot threes at the wing, topped with a Harden-esque stepback three. A fearlessness, rather eagerness by Brown to get up a three, it preferred to a midrange or a layup, profiles a scorer that lies in a different category than that of Flemings or Acuff, the latter two far more comfortable stepping a few feet inside the arc to shoot a middy or long-two.

The fashion in which Brown generated rim pressure versus NC State: Strong off-hand drives initiated by an in-and-out dribble, followed by a clever hang dribble, manipulating space by the threat of his jumper, consequently creating a viable driving lane to the rim if not successfully drawing a foul. The creativity in handle in tandem with a brashness in physicality generated Brown two of his three trips to the line; his halfcourt rim efficacy demonstrated in every form: pick-and-roll, isolation, and off-the-catch.

Brown's acute live-dribble sequencing extends to playmaking; his second of two assists derived from a semi-transition pick-and-roll, timely hitting the slipped roller in space with an overhead entry pass, executed with haste. To specify, Brown seeing his roller slip open, and Brown triggering the pass, was nearly synchronous. This synchronous process is further exemplified in his first assist of the game, another overhead pass, this possession an emphatic skip pass to the corner shooter out of a handoff from the left wing, Brown identifying instantaneously the weakside defender rotating off the corner shooter to cover the slipping hand-off big.

A strong breakout game from Mikel Brown Jr.

ARCHETYPE:

The canonical point guard, revered for their leadership and a philosophy of selflessness and comradery. Tyrese Haliburton, the foremost contemporary canonical point guard, Steve Nash and Chris Paul, the modern NBA maxims. The exponential rise of heliocentric (helio) big guards in James Harden, Luka Doncic, LaMelo Ball, Cade Cunningham, SGA, wi…

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It is neither first overall pick 19-year-old NCAA NPOY Cooper Flagg, or second overall pick and protege nepo point guard Dylan Harper, son of 5-time NBA champion Ron Harper, as of current leading the NBA’s rookie of the year race. Rather it is the 6’7 Milwaukee-born, fourth overall pick, Kon Knueppel. The overarching success of Knueppel was to be expected as a top-five draft pick, specifically as a top-five draftee exiting a hyper-efficient one-and-done season at Duke alongside tantamount prospects Cooper Flagg and Khaman Maluach as a vital contributor to the programs 23rd ACC Tournament Championship (earning tournament MVP) and 18th Final Four appearance. The early success to the magnitude Knueppel has achieved this season however—the fastest player in NBA history to reach 100 career three-pointers—was entirely unanticipated.

In times of prognostic-defiance, a time of which Kon Knueppel is averaging 20.6/5.6/3.8 per75 on +5.4 rTS% through the first 29 professional games of his career, a time in which with every succeeding month Knueppel inscribes himself atop another page within the history books, births an opportune time to retrace and investigate the proceedings building up to the current present, in mission to realign prognostication of “very good shooter” with the actuality of “all-time shooter”. It is parsing through qualitative, quantitative archives and extracting details that can be overseen when simultaneously evaluating a myriad of other prospects.

The initial difficulty of evaluating Kon Knueppel at Duke, prior any extensive analysis, lies in the magnificence of his teammates, or rather, a teammate: Cooper Flagg. 17-years-old, Flagg entered the NCAA as High School Gatorade National Player of the Year, Mr. Basketball, Naismith Prep Player of the Year, and National High School Invitational Champion. He was, by all means, the best high school prospect of the class, all the while being the youngest. Fast forward to the close of their freshman season, and an 18-year-old Cooper Flagg led 35-4 Duke in all major statistical categories: points, rebounds, assists, blocks, steals. The litany of conference and national awards and accolades affirmed his dominance, the fourth player in conference history to win ACC Player of the Year and ACC Rookie of the Year, the fourth freshman in NCAA history to win National Player of the Year. The contributions of Flagg were inseparable in matters concerning Knueppel, or any player on the roster. It could very well be assumed Knueppel’s success was a byproduct of one as the beneficiary of Flagg, rather than the consequence of self-cultivated ability and skill.

Knueppel’s light eventually reached the vision of the NBA front offices, drafted fourth overall, breaking through Flagg’s obfuscating presence, indefatigability fueled by potent perimeter offensive firepower.

Bart Torvik (barttorvik.com) is the most accessible interactive collegiate statistical database (by far as of current with the addition of Women’s NCAAB ) to contextualize the exact scale of Knueppel’s aforementioned firepower in quantitative, historical precedent. Bart Torvik (Bart) is an indispensable instrument for grassroots scouts, those of who began their scouting career publishing content on Twitter or YouTube, independently, a handful of those creators eventually handpicked by NBA teams to join their scouting departments. Adam Spinella for instance, also known as Coach Spins, host of YouTube channel “The Box and One”, accepted a scouting role with the Philadephia 76ers back in October 2023 (the 76ers subsequently drafting Jared McCain 16th overall in the following draft; McCain took the NBA world by storm averaging 23.8 ppg in 8 games starting and 15.3 ppg in 23 games overall before enduring a season-ending leg injury). Prior to joining the 76ers, Spinella would frequently share Bart query results with his thousands of Twitter followers, identifying statistical parallels between NBA prospects of now and the prospects of the past.

To summarize, Bart’s player query feature allows users to discover historical, statistical precedence through a combination of stat value filters (the data base spans back to 2008). If one wants to know all freshmen since 2008 to attempt a minimum 200 threes in a season for instance, Bart can generate the list of players.

Formulating a query with a set of basic statistical parameters—draft status, height, class, role, three-point rate, two-point attempts—relative to the prospect at hand, in this case Kon Knueppel, will generate an index of players who loosely overlap in skillset, strengths and weaknesses, clarifying the bounds of the prospect.

Draft Status: FRP

Height: ≥6’5

3pa/100: ≥10

Class: Freshman

Role: Wing Guard

Knueppel’s initial query is identifying all tall, high-volume three-point shooting “Wing Guard” freshman prospects. This initial query does not discriminate based upon efficiency or impact (box plus-minus). This allows for a wide range of outcomes, a few names that are commonly cited in eye-test comparisons, others who share the general archetype, and a few who vastly differ in playstyle.

With the initial query serving as the bounds of Knueppel, analysis transitions to identifying what concerning Knueppel delineates him from the others, beneficial or detrimental. It calls for a return to the qualitative observations made watching his film.

Knueppel’s perimeter shooting talent is statistically self-evident, 207 three-point attempts, 40.6% 3pt—he’s the sole prospect of the query with ≥200 3pa shooting ≥40% 3pt, though not the sole elite shooting prospect of the query. Devin Booker, Tim Hardaway Jr., and Kevin Huerter also billing impressive shooting seasons. Exclusive to the film is Knueppel exuding great comfort countering aggressive closeout defenses. A conclusion drawn by the fluency and depth of Knueppel’s abilities in off-ball relocation, at the rim, and the precise execution of his in-between game, a degree of expertise by Knueppel grading closer to that of a primary ball-handler or point guard than a three-point off-ball wing, especially through his playmaking and overall pace of play. The core weakness of a three-point specialist like Kispert, Kennard, Hardaway, or Huerter is their vulnerability and variability on-ball. Generally the three-point specialist can adequately counter simple closeouts and execute a high pick-and-roll versus plain PnR coverages such as drop. When the halfcourt possession escalates in complexity however, possessions in which their first read off-the-catch—a pull-up three for instance—is not the best shot available, their offense collapses. Tim Hardaway Jr. can for all intents and purposes dribble the basketball. He can shoot a pull-up three, a pull-up middy, even get to the rim when facing closeout pressure at the perimeter. Tim Hardaway Jr. cannot however, proficiently manage primary-esque ball pressure. Meaning, Hardaway struggles mightily driving against the culmination of POA, strong-side digs, and the low-man rotating to contest at-the-rim. Hardaway, Kispert, Kennard, or Huerter, unlike Kon Knueppel, are overwhelmed in the presence of multilayered, impromptu, constricting defensive schemes, instinctively rushing into bad, off balance, out of rhythm shot attempts, sped up by the looming threat of turnover. One could further this observation of capability into the domain of psychology, through the well known psychological reaction “fight-or-flight”. Knueppel in the presence of these complex threats expresses an eagerness to fight, whilst his NBA comparisons elect flight, conceding to their opponents. This dichotomy expanded over an culmination of games explains Knueppel his rookie season shooting 40% 3pt and 57% 3pt whilst averaging 20ppg (per75), whilst 2017-18 Hardaway Jr. (year five), averaging 19.5ppg (per75) with the Knicks, shot a much worse 31.7% 3pt and 44.2% 2pt on -2.6% rTS. Knueppel instinctive to fight ousts the poor shot quality Tim Hardaway Jr. cubbyholes himself into. It is also Knueppel taking 15.2 fga (per75) a game, while Kennard or Kispert have been fixed to the bench, as their contributions to an offense are narrowly set in off-ball three-point shooting, incapable of performing anything beyond.

The best strategy to identify this quality by Knueppel statistically through Bart is to amend the query with an additional filter: filtering for prospect with a relatively high-volume of rim-attempts.

Draft Status: FRP

Height: ≥6’5

3pa/100: ≥10

Attempts-at-rim: ≥100

Class: Freshman

Role: Wing Guard

To re-emphasize, the amended query is an attempt to identify two-point competent (at-the-rim, floater, or otherwise), high-volume three-point shooters, not a star indicator. For instance, Devin Booker, four-time all-star, two-time all-nba, and averaging 25.8 ppg (per75) over his 11-year career is notably missing from this query though very well-known for two-point competency in the form of midrange shotmaking and interior playmaking. Booker’s two-point fluency is stronger than any of those generated in the amended query. This is explained by Booker’s illustrious NBA career having the two-point volume, though without the high-volume three-point shooting, whereas those qualifying for this query have sustained grand three-point attempt rates (3PAr) while simultaneously achieving above-the-water two-point efficiency (≥50% 2pt). Booker in exchange for league-leading two-point dominance lowered his three-point rate, consequentially sorting himself into a dissimilar bucket to Knueppel within the niche subgroup they find themselves a part of through the original query. Through this amended query, Anthony Edwards and Nickeil Alexander-Walker are the sole bounds of Knueppel.

Knueppel, in his commonality to Alexander-Walker in usage (20.9% usg vs 21.0% usg), is a superior prospect to Alexander-Walker in size (6’7, 220-lbs vs. 6’5 205-lbs), impact (9.5 BPM vs 4.2 BPM), efficiency (59 eFG% & 64.2% TS v 55.4 eFG% & 57.5% TS), turnover-rate (12.9 tov% vs 16.8 tov%), free-throw rate (0.339 FTr vs 0.228 FTr), assist-rate (15.7 ast% vs 10.6 ast%), two-point, three-point volume *and* efficiency, and can thus be expected to surpass the NBA career of Alexander-Walker, at minimum paralleling Alexander-Walker.

Knueppel is not a better prospect to Anthony Edwards, and rather, a different subset of prospect to Edwards all together. Though both high-volume three-point shooters and consistent paint-touch generators as the amended Bart query illustrates, Edwards’ usage rate (28.8% usg vs 20.9% usg) significantly exceeds that of Knueppel’s, indicating Edwards’ role as an on-ball dominant, primary scoring option, whereas Knueppel’s low-usage suggests a ceiling of off-ball dominant secondary scoring option. This suggestion becomes direction when also considering 92.9% of Knueppel’s threes were assisted. It is both Knueppel’s low-usage and off-ball shot-bias that categorizes him distinctly from Anthony Edwards, in which only 47.8% of Edwards’ threes were assisted. For the purpose of projecting Knueppel’s lower and higher outcomes, Edwards will still be used to represent Knueppel’s uppermost ceiling, however unlikely Knueppel playing in resemblance to Edwards may seem to be.

With an in-depth context of Knueppel’s volume, efficiency, and playstyle, one can return to the original query and compare Knueppel to the others in the basics—impact and efficiency. Among the eighteen prospects, Knueppel ranks:

2nd in Box Plus-Minus (9.5 BPM)

2nd in Offensive Box Plus-Minus (6.5 oBPM)

1st in Effective Field-Goal Percentage (59.0% eFG)

1st in True-Shooting Percentage (64.2% TS)

4th in Assist Percentage (15.7 ast%)

4th in Free-Throw Rate (0.339 FTr)

2nd in Two-Point Field-Goal Percentage (56.7% 2pt)

3rd in Three-Point Field Goal Percentage (40.6% 3pt)

It becomes very clear Knueppel is historically one of the best prospects to his role of the last two decades. He ranks top amongst his peers in everything positively concerning offense. Qualitatively he’s one of the more crafty, artful, intuitive prospects of the class, proven by comparatively progressive interior scoring abilities.

Why Kon Knueppel was projected 8th in the Class

Identifying those with size and tangible creation ability was the core objective throughout the 2025 cycle. This process began with identifying those with positionally advantageous size/height, followed by those with primary-tier usage/efficiency, and finally distinguishing those with the lowest assisted field-goal percentage, emphasizing self-creation ability. Knueppel’s final projection was a miscalculation and overleverage in the favor of collegiate primary initiators, undervaluing his holistic contributions to an offense. The fluidity and fluency in which Knueppel oscillates off-ball to on-ball and so forth, exhibited in his scoring aptitude, playmaking, and rebounding—in totality exceeds the contributions of the on-ball contingent shot creating prospects of his class.

Knueppel, designated guard at Duke, was consequently evaluated based upon a key guard requisite: A hyperfocus in off-the-dribble three-point shooting talent. In conjunction with his 14.3% 3pt off-the-dribble (otd) shooting efficiency, 13.3% 3pt shooting efficiency in the PnR, and a less than ideal athletic profile, the prospect of Knueppel returning T3 value cratered. The final evaluation hedged against his shooting prospect. The unsure designation of Knueppel’s position was a consequence of not incorporating Bart’s role-classification feature into analysis, thus misconceptualizing Knueppel’s profile entirely.

The prominence of Dominique Malonga looms in the backdrop of a young, intense, convoluted, sociological, racial, and quintessentially American storyline between superstars Angel Reese, Caitlin Clark, and Paige Bueckers. A storyline stretching far beyond the bounds of the basketball court, one far beyond any action enacted by Reese, Clark, or Bueckers; a storyline transfigured by audiences—fans and media alike—into a political hellfire akin to the expansive and exponentially rising hellfire engulfing the United States of America today. The lore between the three—Reese, Clark, Bueckers—-captivates its competitive and theatrical nature. Each interaction births new commentary beyond the spectrum of basketball, acting as a premise into deliberating the cultural prejudices and sociopolitical dynamics that subsist in the American lifestyle. It is an inescapable storyline; its three dominant forces leaving little left over to discuss the basketball of it all. Rather, its magnanimity dwarfs whatever else is around. Dominique Malonga, for instance.

Dominique Malonga presented an echelon of talent, intellect, and pliability through 40 WNBA games that is only manifested by players whose future is destined for superstardom. Not merely the sporadic all-star appearance, fringe all-WNBA selection, respected franchise talent who through a week of great basketball earns WNBA player of the week—a superstar who commands fear and respect from opposing coaches to players to fans.

Upon draft night, prior to any WNBA games, Malonga stood an outlier amongst colleagues. As an international prospect competing in Euro Cup representing ASVEL Feminin, Malonga already was a professional athlete entering the WNBA, becoming only the third non-collegiate prospect in the past two decades to be selected in the top five of a draft class. And as a non-collegiate prospect, Malonga, eligible, declared for the WNBA draft at 19 years of age, whereas NCAA athletes are ineligible to declare until 21, approaching 22 years old.

Following a three-team deal between the Las Vegas Aces, the Los Angeles Sparks, the original owners of the second overall pick, and the Seattle Storm—Seattle jumped at the opportunity to relinquish star veteran guard Jewell Loyd in exchange for the promising future of Frenchwoman Dominique Malonga. Though, the absence of 30-year-old Jewell Loyd and insertion of 19-year-old Dominique Malonga did not reshape the structure nor overall goal of the Seattle Storm organization for the season. Where the Dallas Wings and Washington Mystics, owners of the first and third overall pick respectively, two of the four bottom teams in the league, the Wings winning a mere 9 games and Mystics 14 out of the 40 game regular season, the Storm were a playoff team—5th in the standings with a 25-15 record. In the departure of Loyd, Seattle’s roster still featured Gabby Williams, Skylar Diggins, and Nneka Ogwumike, the three players all thereafter earning All-Star selections; Williams additionally earning a first-team all-defense selection.

The obligation, the responsibility to compete for a title is the consequence of a roster featuring three all-stars—and enabling a young, unfinished rookie the freedom to make mistakes but nonetheless play extended minutes in the hopes of expedited development is wholly incongruent, daresay antithesis to title ambitions. Thus Malonga, second overall pick, the French phenom, was relegated to Seattle’s bench, scraping for minutes. Entering the all-star break, 20 of 40 regular season games completed, Malonga averaged a hair under 9 minutes of playing time, at 8.8 minutes per game. Paige Bueckers, first overall pick of Malonga’s class, Sonia Citron, third overall pick, averaged 34.9 and 33.5 minutes per game respectively. Few possessions there were to observe Malonga as a player, and a few minutes there were to evaluate her as a teammate.

Limited minutes however, Malonga in an instant was exposed to physicality at a degree impossible to prepare for, its severity grasped only by experience, the rush of colliding bodies akin to the heat rushing to one’s face as it escapes out from the oven door. The heat—Alyssa Thomas, Aliyah Boston, A’ja Wilson, Angel Reese, Napheesa Collier, Brionna Jones, etc.—was overwhelming for 19-year-old Dominique Malonga. A slender 6’6, somewhat analogous to her Frenchman counterpart Victor Wembanyama—Wemby’s anthropometrics are somehow even further otherworldly—was overwhelmed, promptly shut off from her routine scoring, rebounding, by the bumping, shoving, handsy WNBA defender. Take for instance possessions in which Malonga drives to the basket. Whereas in possessions a roller, in which Malonga scores at league efficiency as a beneficiary of her pick-and-roll partner Erica Wheeler, a 37% 3pt shooter, or All-Star Skylar Diggins, in which teams option to employ defensive coverages that assign two on the aforementioned guards at the perimeter, abandoning Malonga racing downhill, wide open, her responsibility narrowed to catching the ball, looking up to the rim, not traveling, and laying the ball in—-Malonga is burdened with putting the ball on the floor and creating the basket all in her lonesome as a driver. There her strength is challenged. Her footwork, patience, shot making, all challenged as every detail matters when it is her, one-on-one, attacking the defender.

Malonga from the outset showed the ability to gain inside leverage against defenders in soft man/drop with her raw speed. Off the catch, from the three-point line, Malonga consistently beat defenders that gave her space to drive; those set in coverage below the 3pt-line, sometimes well below. However, while speed at her advantage, her defender pinned to the side of her body, the path to the rim seemingly open. There remained the defender’s ability to deter with sheer contact. Malonga, as a teenager, is particularly vulnerable to contact defending. There subsists a difficulty in finishing around the rim whilst an opposing force encroaches upon one’s shot. This dynamic drives to her benefit generated the highest free-throw rate among play types; the detractor being Malonga’s drives also generated her highest turnover rate.

It is within expectations that the youngest player in the league accompanied with a slight, elongated frame instinctively avoids the bumps and bruises, quickly amasses turnovers, and battles for efficiency in their self-created offensive possessions. The key is Malonga has natural advantage creation through her athleticism. At 19-years-old, Malonga already has consistently established initial advantages against players a decade superior—the technical aspects, in contrast to advantage creation, are far simpler to improve upon, both in time and comprehension. Physical training builds resilience to contact. Skill training refines one’s footwork and decision making. The natural advantage creation—Malonga’s speed, her hands, her mobility, dexterity, and fluidity at 6 ‘6, is practically impossible to train into one without it. Angel Reese for instance: Beyond her rebounding and post-ups at LSU, there was further potential in Reese as a slasher, given her physically imposing and relatively fluid downhill capabilities as a 6 ‘3 forward. Reese however converted a mere 22.0% of her 2pt drives her rookie season, solidifying herself as one of the worst downhill creators in the WNBA that year. Through training, which Reese shared snippets of through multiple social media platforms regularly throughout the offseason, Reese’s driving efficiency vaulted nearly twicefold from rookie to sophomore year—22.0% to 46.6%. Her natural advantage creation laid the foundation for technical development that is scaling into a refined, put together, concise structure that defenses must now account for in their coverages, a reflection of Reese furthering her offensive impact on the floor. Malonga in her journey will utilize the off-seasons in the same fashion, improving and refining the technicals, and accordingly scaling her offense.

Post All-Star break, in the remaining 20 regular season games, Malonga averaged 20.3 minutes, 11.4 points, 6.7 rebounds, 1.1 assists, shooting 57.6% from the field and 36.4% 3pt. The progression from end of the bench rotation garbage-time asset to competing, sixth-player of the year candidate eventuated not by the transmutation of her weaknesses, dissolved to nothingness if not reborn into strengths—rather the enrichment of techniques that interlace; the composition of the fabric that is Malonga’s play-finishing forte. The WNBA environment can be described as rough-weather conditions—one that challenges comfort, the solidity and resilience of the very interlacing fibers that make up the fabric of a player. These are conditions that necessitate material produced specialized against tumultuous conditions, durable and adaptive to the unprecedented, austere nature of it all—akin to the mountaineer who supplants cotton for a pair of merino wool socks in preparation for his exhaustive, strenuous expedition.

Malonga’s forte has consistently involved possessions in which she can stretch out and score in transition, or act as the final connection from ball to rim whether it be in the form of offensive rebounds, as the roller, or cutter. These possessions in particular optimize her exceptional composition of bounding height, expansive length, tremendous athleticism, whilst being devoid of requisite, sophisticated technical abilities that self-creation calls upon, enabling Malonga to focus solely on positioning and execution.

In modest conditions, as one describes the approach in contrast to the mountain climb, Malonga’s techniques were suitable for the international competition with Lyon Asvel. Her footwork, screening, finishing, all acceptable—in fact, excellent. As transitioned from approach and began her climb, ascent—declaring and then signing to the WNBA, the professional home of every United States women’s gold medalist, who have proven with unambiguity their global sovereignty over the sport of basketball—the air began to thin, the labor of the journey was felt on the body, the quality of technique that was suitable in approach faltered in the climb. Malonga required further precision, confidence, and intuitiveness to conquer the mountain climb. And that she did.

As defenses acknowledged Malonga’s dominance against ball-handler oriented pick-and-roll coverages, in which backline help is left to take up sole responsibility for containing the rolling 6’6 center, coverages shifted towards variations of a soft hedge: the point-of-attack (POA) matched against one of Skylar Diggins, Brittany Sykes, or Erica Wheeler, and the screen-defender containing the open lane created by Malonga’s pick, and the ever shifting passing windows the ball-handler has at their disposable to the rolling Malonga, dashing past the back of the screen-defender. In tandem with hedging, defenses continued to send weakside or nail help, executing a poor man’s double—collapsing on Malonga if she were ever to receive the ball. Denying Malonga the ball was impractical; her standing reach at 6 ‘6 far exceeds that of her defenders, even if one were to jump. Doubling was the next best option. In adapting to this steep ascent, thinner air, her comfort playing freely in straight drive lanes to the basket then concluded—Malonga gradually refined her timing and positioning off-ball to acclimatize. Beginning with the angle of approach, Malonga reached consistency setting screens in a manner that best complimented the tendencies of her PnR partner, optimizing the outcome of ball-screen actions from genesis. Malonga’s synergistic efforts flowed through the possession, aptly setting screens then releasing downhill at a pace in accordance with the tempo of her guard, further optimizing scoring and passing windows whilst simultaneously limiting turnover rate. By season’s end, Malonga ranked T10 among all rollers (averaging a minimum one possession per game) in effective field-goal percentage.

The dexterous and mobile aspects of Malonga’s grand athleticism unlocked a greater avenue of scoring amidst the rugged rookie ascent: Her unsuspecting speed, extended strides, great hands, and fluid body coordination enabled excellent and efficient scoring in transition. At 6’6, often the tallest on the court, also became the fastest on the court, on the open floor. Consistently speed cast Malonga behind the defense, or rather, ahead of the defense, in which a defense’s backline foremost concerned with containing the ball-handler penetrating halfcourt loses Malonga leaking out ahead to the cup. Adept defenses, teams with the capability to manage both the racing Malonga and the intruding ball-handler, at best deny the outlet passes, containing the passing windows to Malonga. This scheme however tends to invite ball-handlers deep into the paint, with personnel overextended in denying the pass, forsaking the player with the ball—relinquishing the ball-handler free reign to the basket. The deep paint touch in desperation drives help to finally rotate on-ball, “help” customarily being Malonga’s defender, in which Malonga is once again left open, an easy dump off to her for the basket. Independently, Malonga has shown the capacity for self-sufficiency, snatching a defensive rebound and unassisted takes the ball coast-to-coast, blazing through and past defenders for a bucket.

Amongst all features of Malonga, the most impactful, transient-bound stands her defense. Channeling her profound talents Malonga quickly consummated a tasteful, esthetical scoring craft chalked with variations of post-spin fadeaway jumpers, the kind of eye-catching shot-creation that ignites great anticipation in the observer for the times of Malonga’s domination over the WNBA, the kind that solicits similitudes to the all-time great scorers. Transcending these longings howbeit lies Malonga’s promise as a defender. It again begins with her height and athleticism, the amalgamation of two intrinsic values measured historically top percentile, finished with an intellect and intuition for the goings and happenings of basketball; it is a composition of values rendering the impression of inevitable eminence.

It bears great significance the youngest player in the league, Dominique Malonga, through her first season sustained the defensive efficacy of a Seattle Storm team 4th in dRTG, coming off the bench in substitution for two premiere, all-defensive frontcourt players in Ezi Magbegor and Nneka Ogwumike. Absent are grand counting stats to cite, readily verifying the defensive prestige of Malonga, averaging a mere 0.7 blocks and 0.4 steals a game. Present nonetheless, is the lineup data indicating nominal drop off in dRTG with Malonga on the floor and All-Defensive Forward Ezi Magbegor off, and filtering out low-leverage possessions, the dRTG of rookie Malonga on and defensive savant Ezi Magbegor or Nneka Ogwumike off stands unchanged.

To defend at center, the position of de facto anchor in defensive schemes, calls for broad defensive competency. Ball-screen coverages, post defense, weakside rim protection, switches, perimeter defense, isolation defense, help-defense—it is a wide, diverse set of actions the center inherits significant responsibility for containing, deterring, and blocking. Beyond the theoretical, conceptual complexity a big is called upon to guard; it is a big called to defend one-on-one against A’ja Wilson or Napheesa Collier, the two best players in the world by significant margin. Malonga, in her first WNBA postseason series, was called to guard reigning MVP, eventual back-to-back MVP, back-to-back scoring champion, 2025 WNBA champion, and 2025 Finals MVP, A’ja Wilson.

It is a win or go home game two for the Seattle Storm, the Las Vegas Aces with a 1-0 advantage in the best-of-three series. Fourth quarter, Aces up eight, A’ja Wilson checks in the game with 8:24 to go, 71-63. Malonga correspondingly is swapped out for the Storm’s leading scorer, Nneka Ogwumike, the respective teams’ star players returning to the action. Without delay, A’ja Wilson gets to work, drawing a foul against Ezi Magbegor with a middle lane left-hand (Wilson’s dominant hand) right-spin step-through drive to the rim. The following Aces possession, Wilson continues working the Storm, this time drawing a foul against Nneka Ogwumike out the left lane low post with a back-to-the-basket, right dribble, spin fade jumper going right, Ogwumike catching Wilson’s elbow with her contest. The Wilson tirade continues against the Malonga-less frontcourt: She draws her third consecutive foul in the Aces third consecutive possession since checking in, Ezi Magbegor once again her victim, as Wilson top of the key out denies Jackie Young’s left-wing ball screen, racing middle lane to the basket, but intuitively feeling the hand of the beat Magbegor at her waist, pulls-up for a ten-foot midrange jumper, drawing the foul and-one. The Storm earn a rest from the Wilson takeover thanks to a Jackie Young turnover (traveling violation), though the very following possession Wilson returned swiftly to pummeling their frontcourt stars, drawing yet another foul against Ezi Magbebor, the third against Magbebor in roughly two minutes of playing time. In deep foul trouble, Head Coach Noelle Quinn is obliged to pull Magbebor, sending Malonga into the full depths of the playoffs. A determined, aggressive A’ja Wilson,an elimination game, down 10, with 6:04 remaining (75-65).

As Wilson made her presence known instantly upon checking in, Malonga followed suit, blocking Jackie Young at the rim and securing the rebound, holding the deficit to ten points. The next Aces possession Jackie Young continued looking to feed A’ja Wilson, though Wilson was uninterested in forcing the issue one-on-one against Malonga, no longer matched up with Magbegor, deferring to Chelsea Gray. Young scratched and clawed for Vegas’ next four points, keeping Seattle out of striking distance as the two teams descended into clutch time, with 4:50 to go (79-70).

Empty side low block, Wilson flash cuts middle of the paint, promptly shooting her famed pull-up middy upon receipt. Yet, the action wasn’t quick enough to beat Malonga, who snuffed out Wilson’s jumper, registering her second block in less than two minutes of playing time. On the other end, after a slew of non-shooting fouls called against the Aces, Skylar Diggins hits a three over a skying Wilson to cut the lead to 6. Aces once again look to feed Wilson against Malonga, using Jewell Lloyd this possession to set a cross screen for Wilson at the weakside nail, Chelsea Gray sending a bounce entry pass to the cutting Wilson at the strong-side low block. Malonga held her ground through the action, recovering from the cross-screen, closing out space against Wilson to contain her driving lanes to the rim, and stayed to the ground through Wilson’s post-spin shot fakes, avoiding the foul, and forcing Wilson to cough up the ball back to Chelsea Gray. Erica Wheeler cashes in a corner three, assisted by Malonga, the lead cut down to three with 3:03 remaining (79-76). A’ja Wilson went scoreless in the 3 minutes after Malonga checked into the game. The two teams tussled for the ensuing two minutes, a back and forth that kept the Aces ahead with a four-point lead. Malonga had effectively iced Wilson out the game; Wilson continually deferring the ball against the 6 ‘6 rookie in positions she otherwise looked to score in when matched with Ezi Magbebor.

Less than 45 seconds to the final buzzer, 83-81 Aces; A’ja Wilson tried her hand once more against Malonga, a left-lane face-up middy, clanking the front rim. Nneka Ogwumike grabs the defensive rebound, passes it up to Skylar Diggins, and Diggins, immediately spotting Dominique Malonga leaking out in transition ahead of all five Vegas players, launches an outlet pass to the outstretched hands of Malonga, who catches the ball in stride and finishes through a Chelsea Gray foul and-one. With her free-throw, Malonga put the Storm ahead by a single point, 83-84, after trailing through two quarters. 27 seconds to buzzer, Chelsea Gray makes a poor inbounding pass, turning the ball over back to the Seattle Storm. Diggins, iso, whittles the shot clock down to one second, four seconds game clock, before icing out the Aces with a pull-up middy over a hounding Jackie Young. Jewell Lloyd with four seconds chucks a three 27-feet out, misses, and the Seattle Storm win game 2, avoiding elimination, their rookie off the bench holding the best player in the league scoreless single-handedly in the final six minutes of the game.

23-year-old Jalen Romande Green was the subject of a blockbuster trade this offseason, the Houston Rockets attaching multiple first-round picks and trade filler with the in exchange for the Phoenix Suns 36-year-old All-Star Kevin Durant. Presumably, for Jalen Green to have avoided trade talks, his year-four body of work required to either been analogous to that of any successful starting scoring guard in their fourth season, or a body of work when compared to his prior seasons, illustrated clear offensive growth. Neither option was achieved.

23-years-old, still, is an early age to forgo the future of a healthy, 20ppg, athletic guard. As the number two pick in the draft, sandwiched between two uber-talented, refined prospects, Green, portrayed en masse by draft analysts as “raw”, and unrefined, made his name with grand, distinguished highs. The feats commenced with a commitment to G League’s prospect development arm, Ignite, turning down the NCAA as a whole. Green, 18-years-old, embraced the potential upside and simultaneous unforeseen challenges intertwined with facing post-collegiate, professional competition. Though, with no history of the Ignite program prior to Green, the concept of a pre-draft developmental program within the G League unproven in its efficacy, the efficacy of the G League itself as a development system of the NBA in contention—the endeavor by Green held risks far greater than the preservation of his draft stock.

Still, in July of 2021, Jalen Green was drafted second overall to the Houston Rockets. As the number one high school prospect in the country by ESPN 100, the second-best prospect per 247 sports, subsequently drafted second overall into the NBA, at face value, his tenure with Ignite and G League was a proven success.

Every G League performance by Green featured at least one sensational highlight. One possession his feet linger above ground far longer than the law of physics states one possibly could—the following possession Green tween-tween dribbles into an erratic yet alluring stepback three, reminiscent of the stepback magnate himself, James Harden. Another possession, Green throws a braggadocios right hand dunk to the basket, slamming the rim with utmost authority. Cade Cunningham nor Evan Mobley, the first and third overall prospects of the class respectively—the two prospects in which Green’s name was continuously pitted against—couldn’t manufacture the highlights, the fashion of excitement and entertainment that Green brought with his game.

Above all, he’s a scoring guard. Micheal Jordan. Kobe Bryant. James Harden. Anthony Edwards. Dwayne Wade. It’s an archetype of player one watches with adoration and reverence as a youth. Their total embrace to the artistry of scoring—sophisticated, a radicalized form of basketball that embodies the pinnacle of elegance and autocracy, an expression of creativity, brashness, avant-gardism—one that spreads its influence on the next generation and thereafter.

Ignite Jalen Green, in addition to his gratifying, entertaining nature, had a professedly undeniable parallel to his scoring guard forefathers. And as Green was approvingly drafted second overall, it is unquestionable the difficulty there existed in separating the reality of Green as a prospect, and his resemblance to hall-of-famers with every stepback three, crossover pull-up middy, or high-flying dunk.

The prolonged 82-game NBA season, a schedule that in its length exposes all good, great, bad, and abysmal, consequently revealed the full, undistracted composition of Jalen Green. He was marked for a most impressive rookie campaign, citing his presumed advantage of competing in the G League prior to, already familiar with the professional environment, substantiated with productional success. A magnificent three-game Summer League stint reaffirmed expectations, once more Jalen Green etched parallels to the great shooting-guards with silky smooth bump drive turnaround middies, impromptu yet precise stepback threes, and an excess of drawn fouls.

First-team All-Rookie, the single-game scoring record high among rookies with a 41 point performance versus the Atlanta Hawks, and the second rookie to score 30-plus points in five-straight games, the first being 1997 Rookie of the Year (ROY) Allen Iverson—Green’s rookie campaign was chalk full of accolades and accomplishments. Still, a discrepancy persisted between Jalen Green and the constructed ideal of Jalen Green.

The euphoric moments were curbed by the cardinal emotion that plagues all sport fans alike; anxiety. A pattern had developed within his rookie season: With every handful of rapturous performances followed weeks stretch of dreadful, unrecognizable games. The unparalleled experience of instability, volatility. Eventually, one no longer revels in joy, and instead is overwhelmed by the anxiety, ousted by the premonition of inevitable unpleasant showings from Jalen Green. An unfolding paradox. He led all rookies in 30-plus point games yet placed sixth among starting rookies in 15-plus point games, all while ranking second in field-goal attempts.

Indeed, the environment of his first two seasons with the Rockets were decrepit, janky to say the least. The departure of Russell Westbrook and James Harden prior to Green’s arrival (their departure enabled the Rockets organization to “tank” games, positioning the franchise to win the second pick in the lottery and consequently draft him) also entailed a brain drain of meticulously selected front office and coaching talent. Future Hall of Fame Head Coach Mike D’Antoni, innovator of the “7 seconds or less” offense alongside MVP point guard Steve Nash with the Phoenix Suns in the early 2000s, thereafter the orchestrator of the iso-dense offense led by MVP James Harden with the Houston Rockets in the mid 2010s, two all-time, league-altering offenses, abruptly announced his exit following the Rockets capitulation in the 2020 playoffs. General Manager Daryl Morey, heralded for his analytical, technical foresight and keen eye for overlooked talent, correspondingly announced his exit from the Houston Rockets as well. Rafael Stone, then assistant general manager, was promoted—with no prior experience—to general manager. Stone’s first crucial hire was Head Coach. Stone selected Stephen Silas, another individual with no prior experience to their hired role, who in his previous two decades in the NBA functioned as an assistant coach to a multitude of teams, best acknowledged for his offensive insights with the Dallas Mavericks and a young superstar Luka Doncic. Coach Silas then recruited and assembled his own personal cabinet of assistant coaches, 60% of which also had zero prior experience of the role. Upon securing the second overall pick, and subsequently the acquisition of Jalen Green, the roster was further hollowed out of any remaining experienced personnel. A move that can only be interpreted as an aggressive, high-risk scheme to once more tank for a season, staking future success in the ever-eluding lottery odds. Former All-NBA and All-Star point guard John Wall, under contract to the Rockets in Green’s rookie season, was requested to not only to sit out for the season in favor of stacking minutes for Jalen Green, Kevin Porter Jr., and other rookie guard Josh Christopher, but to completely remove himself from the team, disallowed from participating in practices and workouts with the Rockets. In turn, by design, Green was left with a subdued, overtly introverted, Eric Gordon as a mentor. Gordon, a prized scoring guard and defender, did not possess the breadth of expertise requisite to appropriately guide Green in his overbearing quest to lead a franchise to success. To score in volume off the advantages created by others, Gordon understood with unwavering confidence. To initiate, organize, facilitate, and create, not at any point in his career did Gordon achieve expertise in those concepts. That is not to demean Gordon, but to emphasize that Gordon’s function on the court did not entail leadership, but instead to execute. So, it was unfair to designate Gordon the responsibility of mentoring the mind of a 20-year-old second overall pick who was uniquely tasked with such weighty responsibility. And conversely to be assigned with Eric Gordon as his mentor, someone who additionally had no desire to be a part of non-playoff/championship aspiring teams—recognizing his own career mortality at a then 33 years-old—wishing further opportunities to compete for a championship, was and proved to be an unfair circumstance to Jalen Green.

Adding further complications was the presence of presiding feature players Christian Wood and Kevin Porter Jr., two individuals with less than meritorious reputations. Their tenure with the Rockets is spotlighted by mid-game walkouts, off-court altercations, infamous locker room meltdowns, in-house suspensions, and overtly selfish on-court tantrums. Green couldn’t possibly manage these characters, nor be expected to as a rookie. He could only adapt to these personalities, for better or for worse.

Few prospects in interchangeable scenarios with Jalen Green maintain their star outcome. It’d require a player with a personality and commitment to work resilient to an environment composed of abject incompetency and distraction. Further, it’d require a player whose skillset can at its minimum persist through turbulent headwinds, and lead where there’s no true leaders, guiding in absolute crisis. The state of the Houston Rockets was no condition for those who necessitated guard rails along their journey to striking success. No condition for the “raw” ilk of prospect that requires firm, exemplary mentorship concerned with leadership, discipline, intellect, and the cultivation of team culture.

Entering tumultuous conditions as a rookie is an experience non-exclusive to Jalen Green. Bad teams produce poor records, poor records earn best odds to acquiring best talent, best talent drives bad teams out of despair into prosperity. The drive is an interminable pressure steered at the general manager, in which they are bound to design a roster as ambitious and competitive as their best talent. Failure means replacement.

The Detroit Pistons, Charlotte Hornets, Atlanta Hawks, Philadelphia 76ers, Phoenix Suns, all contemporary examples of franchises fitted with “best talent”, armed with failing executives, and statured by defective rosters. Eventually the failing executives were replaced, defective members of the roster traded and replaced, head coaches replaced, and best talent once more fostered through the draft. All efforts to align the franchise with the ambitions and ability of their premier best talent.

In the 2021 draft, following the Rockets selecting Jalen Green second overall, general manager Rafael Stone in an aggressive pursuit, relinquishing multiple (protected) first-round picks, acquired the rights to Alperen Sengun at 16th overall from the Oklahoma City Thunder. Unknown at draft night, Sengun, likewise to top picks Cade Cunningham, Evan Mobley, was a best talent. An extraordinary privilege extended to Jalen Green, the benefits to gain sharing the beginning of his career with another high talent that furthermore plays at the frontcourt, enabling the potential for a degree of chemistry and firepower that could serve in due time as the foundation to a championship team.

Sengun likewise experienced the incompetencies and dramas as Green were exposed to, though hindsight would suggest Sengun benefited by head coach Silas relegating him to limited minutes off the bench—whereas Green fronted all good, bad, and ugly.

Sengun prior to entering the NBA played three years of professional basketball in the Turkey Basketball Super League (T-BSL) with the Bandirma Kirmizi at 16-years-old, Teksut Bandirma at 17, and Besiktas Icrypex at 18-years-old, each season marking a progression in competition and an increase of responsibilities, and in triumph earned league MVP in his final season, becoming the youngest in league history to win the award. His Turkish accolades and hence draft acclaim were owed to extraordinary offensive talent, with emphasis to his aptitude for playmaking, a rarity of his position at center.

The divergence in fate between Jalen Green and Alperen Sengun—Sengun earning an All-Star nod, glorified as the face of the Rockets franchise, while Green becomes the defining bargaining chip for a near 37-year-old Kevin Durant—lies in the misconception of Green, the effect of an over fixation with innate talent, and the disregard for the intrinsic value of mastery in the intellectual and bodily fundamentals.

Contradictory it is for Jalen Green, master of exhaustingly intricate shooting sequences—side-step middies and threes, double stepbacks, tween-tween pull-ups—to be labeled “raw”. Raw is to be unrefined, rough around the edges, prone to involuntary errors, yet explosively effective in specific conditions. It is a label predominantly assigned to athletes whose sole weapon is athleticism. Green indeed is an elite, top-percentile athlete, but invariably accompanying his athleticism, tracing back to his AAU days, was his tireless shotmaking. Raw suggests an absence of experience, that with repetitions, both in practice and in-game, the player develops to a satisfactory, possibly proficient manner of ability. Green was not a raw prospect. Green was an inconsistent prospect.

Physically, mentally, the process of sustained improvement, development, even as theory, is wondrously mysterious and obscure, it’s nonlinear form the only fundamental truth. Practice a known requisite, of course. Yet every player practices. Josh Hart, New York Knick’s purported Swiss army knife, was noted by star teammate Jalen Brunson for his concerted efforts this past offseason honing his prominently dull jumper. Following a heart wrenching seven-game series loss to the Indiana Pacers in the Eastern Conference Semi-Final Playoffs, Hart, in his efforts to drastically improve his shooting, professed his own transfiguration from indispensable regular season asset to hemorrhaging postseason liability, as calculating defenses brazenly exposed his inability and apprehension to shoot threes. And ensuing his devoted offseason, preseason, even in-season efforts, Hart finished the regular season still shooting far below league average. Defenses remained contempt to granting him wide open threes.

How many offseasons of relentless efforts would it take Hart to gain a respectable jumper? Upon attaining a respectable jumper, could Hart maintain it beyond a single season? 39.6% 3pt Hart shot his rookie year, never to achieve such efficiency again in his subsequent 7 seasons. Hart, his trainer, his teammates, nor his coaches could, if questioned, provide an accurate answer, for there is no system guaranteeing the outlook of one’s future. The fruits of labor are nonguaranteed in the NBA. C’est la vie.

Green reforming his deficiencies is likewise, nonguaranteed. Prominent deficiencies, three-point shooting efficiency and half-court rim efficiency to name, are two incredulously difficult skills to markedly improve upon and further sustain at great volumes. It is not as though Green is not a strong perimeter scorer or rim finisher entirely. Dating back to his rookie season, Green consistently features an ostensibly watershed stretch of high scoring, efficient-laden performances. Rockets fans harken back to his 15-game stretch in March of 2024, in which Green averaged 27.7 points per game, shooting 40.8% 3pt on a whopping 9.5 attempts, masterfully leading the Rockets to a much needed 13-2 record as they desperately fought for play-in seeding. Compared to the 59 games prior to his March takeover, Green was averaging a mere 17.9 points shooting 31.2% 3pt on 6.7 attempts, while the mean efficiency amongst players to attempt six or more threes per game (minimum 50 games played) sat at 37.9% 3pt. An insurgence in scoring by a third-year former second-overall pick is assuredly attributed to an imminent approach to proficiency. An approach that further, given its arrival at the close of the season, is expected to sustain and advance through the forthcoming seasons. Instead, Green his fourth year returned to the shooting/efficiency splits of the past, the imminent approach to proficiency derailed. Once more, there was a feature stretch of performances from Green; 25 games from Thanksgiving Day to the closing days of January, averaging 23.8 points shooting 40.9% 3pt on 7.9 attempts. The season in its entirety paralleled the previous seasons he was expected by all to progress from.

There is no indicative evidence suggesting Green escapes from his consistency of inconsistencies. Only the presumption that with his aging comes maturity, and with maturity brings stability, and stability welcomes improvement, and the improvement vacates the chasms of his game.

The disregard for the intrinsic value of proficiency in the fundamentals within scouting. In a context wherein teams feature players 6’10, 7’0 and beyond, capable of obscuring paths and angles to the basket by way of sheer size, a fundamental ability requisite of a player inferior in stature, for instance, is scoring at extended distances from the basket; shooting. The fundamentals are the abilities that first make use of one’s talents, then anthropometric strengths, and finally the countermeasures to one’s anthropometric weaknesses. They’re then further refined, potentially reorganized, tailored to the player’s archetype/role. Brooklyn Net Michael Porter Jr. and once-more Houston Rocket Clint Capela, sharing a height of 6’10, own a distinct list of fundamental abilities despite their similarity in stature, as their on-court talents are nearly inverse to each other.

Speed, agility, and space creation, hallmark talents of Jalen Green, complemented with a score first mentality, fit the archetype that of a scoring guard. The creativity and doggedness in approach great scoring guards imbue to accumulate points en masse fundamentally requires resilient handle and body strength—repeatedly navigating through waves of defenders distinctive in size and approach, all targeting the ball, one’s body, the spot they anticipate one heading to, a combination of two, potentially all three, managed entirely in a high pace, omnidirectional environment—the pressures incessantly befalling one to yield turnover demands indomitable control over the body and its extension thereof. Talent in solitude floats Green’s scoring production above water—his talent the source of periodic 25, 30, 40-plus point performances—a life raft sheltering him from the ocean depths of “expendable fill-in rotation player”, the single-digit, sub-fifteen point games act as mighty currents, its subsequent waves challenging the integrity of the life raft and consequently Green.

The fundamentals are inescapable for the heights Green envisioned to reach. The NBA surely isn’t marketed as a contact sport—major media outlets at every opportunity share their distaste for the present level of physicality and policing thereof, harkening back to the blatant assaults by defenders of the 80s and 90s that were masqueraded as tough defense—though todays leading scorers all boast an unwavering, outright dominant and abrasive style of offense anchored in brute strength. Shai Gilgeous-Alexander’s scoring preeminence is repeatedly underscored by his colossal shoulder strength, strength that unlocks space creation with heavy shoulder bumps into stepback jumpers or open drives to the rim. Luka Doncic dictates spaces with uncanny denseness of his body, free to displace defenders at will, inversely a fixed being grounded to floor as defenders futilely impose their figure unto him. Embiid, by nature of being an athletic, seven-foot, 280-lb big, an everlasting rim creation threat, sheds smaller defenders with ease, while often overwhelming the bigs comparable to his size.

With emphasis to the ilk of scoring guard that is Jalen Green, a class of scoring guard that leads with speed and bounce—Donovan Mitchell, Anthony Edwards contemporary examples of its pinnacle—experiences narrow success devoid of strength creation. The force exerted to accomplish the consistency, efficiency, and volume of an Edwards or Mitchell requires a body that sustains and surmounts. The burden of responsibility for Edwards, Mitchell, as the go-to scorer for an offense whilst being one of the shortest/smallest players on the floor, bumped, shoved, swarmed, hacked—efficiency is not given through strength, it’s the quality of resilience that is earned instead.

A player’s regular season is first evaluated by their scoring efficiency, then scoring volume. High scoring averages achieved on inefficient splits can be construed as stat-padding or an embodiment of “empty calorie” scoring production. Both narratives devalue and diminish the value proposition that ultimately attracts volume scorers.

The playoffs, however, are evaluated with scoring volume taking precedence, then scoring efficiency. The playoffs, a postseason tournament comprised of several rounds of best-of-seven series, directly challenges the limits of a team’s strengths and weaknesses through its win-or-go-home, high-leverage, antagonistic structure. The schedule condenses from a certain 82-game, around-the-country, play on the fly blitz to a concise, yet uncertain limited game series, the foreseeable future fixed exclusively against one team. The playoff structure enables refinement and game planning specific to the sole opponent, in contrast to the various teams scheduled through a two-week block within the regular season, for instance. Defenses are given the advantage of familiarity, intimacy, and repetition—the sharpest defenses can transfigure the most potent, precise regular season offenses into sluggish, defective nonfactors. Accordingly, dare say inevitably, rises amidst the postseason a great credence to the quality of resilience. Contrasting Jalen Green’s first playoff series to teammate Alperen Sengun’s—staggeringly inefficient in their seven-game first-round series loss versus the Golden State Warriors—Sengun demonstrated, above all, an ability to put up shots in conditions where defenses had thrown the kitchen sink at him. By no means was Sengun efficient, but as Green, Houston Rockets regular season leading scorer, was effectively shut down from even attempting to create any avenue of offense, let alone his likewise efficiency woes, Sengun acted as the sole shot creator on the team.

The Warriors, enabled by the NBA’s openly lenient officiating throughout the playoffs, and further encouraged by former defensive player of the year and future hall-of-famer Draymond Green, who has garnered a reputation for reckless, hard-nosed, physical, cunning defending, designed a gameplan that challenged Green to score against waves of ball pressure, wagering his offense would completely collapse against the physical toll. He did.

The form of great players consists of a natural balance. Where there is lack in one direction there is an abundance in the approximate opposite, the balance confidently tilted to the direction that of abundance. And within this natural balance there consists further measures of talents and skillsets on speculative balance scales, illustrating which approximate opposites are imbalanced or offset to one another—all amounting to the overall natural balance. Natural balance, observed at the surface level, is a primary shot creator with poor defensive efficacy, for instance. Simply, an offensive asset and defensive liability. Luka Doncic fits this illustration, and the extent to which he produces and delivers offense as a primary shot creator comfortably outweighs his profile as a defensive liability. This balance generates positive return on investment, the minutes, usage, and sovereignty extended unto him representing the investment, regular and postseason success representing the return.

The balancing deepens, in which the particulars are measured, delineating a player archetypes distinct form. Doncic, a shot creator: His form illustrates the balance between wizardly technical ability (shooting, dribbling, passing), and the pronounced absence of explosive athleticism (first-step, twitch, running speed, jumping power). It is a form that generates scoring advantages by precise technical execution, recurrently exploiting whatever slight gaps yielded to him. Juxtaposed to fellow shot creator Ja Morant, who instead harnesses his superfluity of explosive athleticism to generate interior scoring advantages, in which offsets his subpar perimeter shooting proficiency. Morant’s form generates scoring advantage through sheer athletic prowess—to outspeed, outjump—wagering his physical peak will surmount that of his defenders.

The scoring guard archetype is an imbalance tipped expressively towards technical scoring proficiency against one’s comparatively scarce playmaking talent. Donovan Mitchell and Anthony Edwards as examples once more: Mitchell, one of a few players in NBA history to score 70 points, and Edwards, one of five players to cash in over 300 three-pointers in a single season. Neither have an accolade or accomplishment concerning assists that rivals their respective scoring achievements. Green follows in those footsteps. And thus, without playmaking as an additional arm as a scoring guard, his contributions to offenses archetypically founded in scoring, the margin for inefficient, inconsistent, low-tally scoring are rather thin. A thin margin fully realized when additionally accounting for the scoring guard archetypically falling into the player bucket of “defensive liability”.

To offset negligible if not detrimental defensive impact, in addition to bolstering negligible to incrementally positive playmaking impact, top percentile scoring creation, efficiency, volume, becomes requisite of a starting scoring guard. Otherwise, as the league has demonstrated over the past three years, the scoring guard is considered expendable.

2025:

• Utah Jazz dealt 26-year-old Collin Sexton for a second-round pick and trade-filler contract-expiring rapidly declining 30-year-old Jusuf Nurkic.

• The rebuilding Portland Trailblazers exchanged 25-year-old Anfernee Simons scoring guard for 34-year-old point guard Jrue Holiday.

• Closing his first season as Clippers starter, achieving his best season with the organization if not of his career, a most-improved-player finalist, scoring guard Norman Powell was subsequently dealt for power forward John Collins.

2023:

• The Golden State Warriors targeted and acquired 38-year-old point guard Chris Paul to deal 23-year-old scoring guard Jordan Poole, attaching a first-round pick and additional assets to Poole to finalize the deal for Paul.

Now, it is 23-year-old Jalen Green exchanged for 37-year-old Kevin Durant. Though the foreseeable upside was great, the tandem of athleticism and shotmaking promising offensive abundance, in practice, his surmounting approximate-opposites dragged the scale into a balance illustrating inconsistency and setbacks, approximate-opposites to his offensive talents too great to overcome under the responsibility of a franchise player. The allure of Green will always spur hope and a discipline of faith in those devoted to the potential of a superstar future. Entering his 5th year, now a veteran to the game, expected to lead, guide, and prepare incoming rookie talents, not owing to being the former number-two pick, but for the 300-plus games played, the journey hitherto, as a starter, a leading scorer, and the valleys of those peaks that influenced the breakup from the Houston Rockets. Therein blossoms opportunity to rebalance his form, to trench the existing, failing habits, to supplant those with the principle, structurally critical fundamentals, to redefine his character at scoring guard. It is a massive undertaking, to delve into the unfamiliar, likely to incur error upon error, the threat of sacrificing the parts that presently bring one success, whilst fulfilling the expectations placed upon oneself, by teammates, by franchise, by fans. And as time passes, the form solidifies, to reform the valleys amidst the peaks no longer feasible, and instead are refined, as one finally accepts the maximum of their contributions to stave off the depths of the turbulent valleys.

As complex data analytics, player metrics, models, permeate through all facets of professional and amateur basketball, front office personnel and grassroot scouts alike have yet to formulate a resilient, back tested method of identifying talent to draft at pick value or better. The purpose of NBA metrics are straightforward—ranking player value by assigning a numerical value to production and/or impact. It illustrates the value of a player for one season, Value Over Replacement Player (VORP) for example, while fresher models amalgamates ones value across multiple concurrent seasons, Regularized Adjusted Plus/Minus (RAPM) for instance. None of the aforementioned metrics however are fit to project the outcome of a prospect a decade out.

Box Plus-Minus (BPM), a commonly referenced metric in NBA spaces, extracts a player’s box score production (points, assists, turnovers, rebounds, steals, blocks, fouls, field-goal attempts, three-point field-goals made, and free-throw attempts), the overall team adjusted efficiency, and their position to generate a numerical value that indexes who numerically contributes the most in the 450-plus man league . In ‘25 , per basketball-reference, Nikola Jokic, three-time MVP, stood atop the league. The reigning MVP, FMVP, and NBA Champion, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (SGA) at number two, and two-time MVP and former DPOY Giannis Antetokounmpo third. Luka Doncic and Victor Wembanyama complete the top five. This top 5 subsists in spirited debate—Is SGA truly better than Giannis, is Wemby already a top five player in only his second season—the conversations progress on and on.

It is sensible to challenge the authority of metrics over basketball dialogue. No metric so far has offered an objective formula to evaluating prospects, with curves and varying estimates in the attempt of balancing or rewarding players by position, role, minutes played, usage, etc. Quickly one can identify the steadily gaping flaws with attaching sophisticated mathematical formulas to analyze a children’s game. These imperfections deepen within the draft landscape.

An example. The 2020 draft class featured a most unorthodox top three: Anthony Edwards of the University of Georgia, drafted first overall, was described as a prospect with an iffy commitment to basketball the sport, the NBA as a job, and all of the efforts on and off the court in relation to it. James Wiseman, drafted second overall, played a mere three regular season games with the University of Memphis before serving a 12-game NCAA suspension, and eventually withdrawing himself from the University to focus his time on preparing for the NBA draft. Lamelo Ball, drafted third overall, the youngest brother/son of an ever-viral, theatrical, do-it-your-own-way family, the “Ball” family, played overseas in Lithuania and Australia for two seasons in preparation for the NBA draft, a decision met with astonishment, disbelief, and condemnation by fans and national media alike.

Shattering the legitimacy of these reproaches, Edwards and Ball in extraordinary fashion reached NBA stardom with haste. Wiseman just as quickly was realized a failure. Still, Edwards and Ball are not the only unforeseen successes of the 2020 draft class. In addition to the first and third overall pick, 12th overall pick Tyrese Haliburton and 21st overall pick Tyrese Maxey earned all-star selections, all before the age of 24.

A metric approach seeking out the 2020 cycle’s top prospects would overlook all four of its all-stars. Possibly through arduous filtering, historic data comparisons, and data manipulation, one would identify sophomore Tyrese Haliburton as without-a-doubt one of the best prospects of the 2020 class. BPM alone however, or any other applicable do-it-all metric, to name a few, ranked Obi Toppin, Onyeka Okongwu, Jalen Smith, ahead of the two-time All-NBA and assist champion Haliburton. In the NBA Draft domain, time and time again, these metrics prove to exist merely as a piece to the puzzle, but not the solved puzzle itself.

A model will likely never project a draft class accurately. It is impossible to condense the many variables that comprise the journey of an NBA career into data points. Organizations, injuries, shooting developments, scoring regressions, stagnation, family, personalities, vices, character—the best crystal ball will inevitably lie in the eyes of people, who intrinsically discern these components.

So rather than deplete resources into finding a systemic solution to the draft—a research equivalent to a scientist searching answers to human consciousness—teams should transition to pursuing young diamonds in the chaotic undergrowth that is an NBA roster. With frequent changes to cap space, cap rules, and recurring trades, the NBA has witnessed young players sent away as trade filler, salary dump, transform into stars. The unforeseen rise of Houston Rocket James Harden, New York Knick Jalen Brunson, and Oklahoma City Thunder Shai Gilgeous-Alexander as examples. Each began their NBA journey off-the-bench, then the subject of cap-related trades, finally blossoming into superstardom with their new franchise.

At lower magnitudes of trajectory this concept still applies. There exists cheap, ultra-efficient rotation pieces who seemingly materialize out of thin air with each passing season. In 2025, the league was introduced to breakouts Cleveland Cavalier Ty Jerome, Memphis Grizzly Jay Huff, and Portland Trailblazer Toumani Camara. All three entered the league in their early twenties after illustrious, long careers at their respective college programs. Huff and Jerome were teammates on the 2019 University of Virginia (UVA) NCAA Championship squad, while Camara won multiple All-A10 awards with Dayton University. Huff and Jerome endured delayed success as NBA players, Huff for instance not receiving his first full NBA contract until his fourth season in the league at 26 years-old.

Camara on the other hand, the second-round, 52nd pick, earned a Second-Team All-Defensive spot in only his second season. Now recognized as a top defender, and rapidly evolving offensively, Camara will force front offices to modify the existing conventions made about elite-defensive upperclassmen prospects.

None of the three are projected to be superstars, stars, Huff and Jerome unlikely to even pry their way into a starting rotation on a competitive team, nonetheless each player makes integral contributions to the success of their team. Above all, none of the three prior to 2025 would demand any difficulty in acquiring.

Brice Sensabaugh will inevitably enter this cohort of unexpected rising talent. The 6’6 small forward completed his second season in 2025 with 71 games played, averaging 10.9 points per game on 59.0 eFG%. Rotation volume (8.4 fga), outlier scoring efficiency.

He, along with Desmond Bane, Payton Pritchard, and Duncan Robinson are the only rookie/sophomore players in the past two decades (qualified by minutes per game) to average (per 75 possessions): ≥15 ppg | ≥8 3pa | ≥40% 3pt | ≥55% eFG, per Stathead. Within their distinct playstyles, they all illustrate the ideal of low/mid-usage, high-efficiency perimeter production offensive assets.

Of this company, Desmond Bane carried and continues to carry the highest offensive responsibilities, first, as the only definitive starter, and two, as the only definitive ball-handler. As his star point guard Ja Morant has battled a multitude of injuries, in addition to his 20ppg DPOY power forward Jaren Jackson Jr. with his fair share of setbacks, and finally Bane himself enduring time away from play due to injuries, scalability had become his calling card. Through the ebbs and flows of an injury-ridden, fluctuating roster, the Memphis coaching staff had a luxury in Bane, who could maintain scoring aggression irrespective to the offensive burden placed upon him. Bane poses the greatest threat in transition, dictating pace in accordance to the structure of the defense, assessing whether a pull-up three, strong drive to the rim, or the extra pass to a teammate is best option available. Leveraging the threat of his elite pull-up shooting, Bane as he approaches the three-point line, loves to shift gears to bully ball the very moment his defender settles his feet to guard the potential three, driving hard to the rim for what is in most possessions a simple look at the rim.

Payton Pritchard slowly but surely ascended from the depths of the Boston Celtics, playing a career-high 28 minutes per game this past season, his play rewarded with the NBA’s Sixth Man of the year award. Pritchard injects a distinct energy into the Tatum-era Boston Celtics, an era commonly critiqued for its robotic, drive-kick-shoot three-point mania. The intermix of Pritchard’s perimeter shot creation off the dribble and his utility in pin down actions enabled the 61-win Celtics to maintain their unwavering hallmark blitz of an offense in minutes their star creators in Tatum, Brown, and White were off the floor.

Duncan Robinson differs from the former listed in the query. A wing specialist who creates offense near-exclusively along the perimeter. Duncan after meeting this threshold in his second season failed to meaningfully scale any further as a scorer, in consequence to his absence of interior play-finishing, an issue of simple volume, not efficiency. This should not suggest Robinson bears poor offensive utility. His high-volume three-point scoring appraises immense value in the contemporary NBA.

Examining further into the basketball careers of Bane, and Pritchard in particular, one could surmise their paths to success was by no miracle. Desmond Bane and Payton Pritchard both far above collegiate average for guards, an impeccable feat as the unequivocal leading scorer to their respective programs. A blend of dominant off-ball shooting at all levels of the floor, followed by clever and confident self-creation , set the stage for both prospects to seamlessly translate their playstyles to two NBA franchises who bread success through fast-pace, decisive offenses.

Correspondingly, Ohio State Buckeye Brice Sensabaugh was also the leading scorer at his collegiate program, also shooting far above collegiate league average for a guard/forward. Analogous to Pritchard and Bane, Sensabaugh plays with a mix of high-percentile off ball scoring and advanced shot creation, reaching an air of production and efficiency reached by very few.

Survey deeper into the Brice Sensabaugh profile, and a divergence finally emerges between the forward and his two predecessors. Sensabaugh, standing at 6’5, arms outstretched to the measure of 6’11-7’2 (unofficial record), scales taller and significantly longer than Bane or Pritchard. Anthropometrically (with exception to his weight), Sensabaugh represents the NBA’s ideal phenotype. To add, Sensabaugh also bests in age. Entering his third NBA season at the age of 22, Sensabaugh has accrued years of NBA experience at an age Payton Pritchard was in his fourth year at the University of Oregon, not yet drafted. Desmond Bane had only began his rookie season with the Memphis Grizzlies at 22 years old. The discrepancy in age, accounting for the parallel per-possession production, is the best on-paper indicator, daring to say confirmation, of Sensabaugh’s grand talent. He projects further than an off-the-bench 3pt plug-in, where he’s at now.

Despite the scoring absurdities, scouts engaged Sensabaugh’s future with cynicism, citing his physical fitness, injuries, and athleticism as weighty detractors. These claims naturally flow into a vast torrent of concerns, questioning the severity of Sensabaugh’s shoddy defense, and worse, the likelihood that it will ever improve. Devoid of the grace extended to distinguished five-star, Team USA, McDonalds All-American recruits, Sensabaugh’s outlier scoring profile was promptly dismissed.

The effect was another parallel to Payton Pritchard and Desmond Bane. Brice Sensabaugh entered draft night with no invite to the coveted green room, ergo drafted in the closing picks of the first round, to the Utah Jazz at 28. Drafted closer to the second round than the lottery, Sensabaugh entered the league with minimal guaranteed to his name. His minutes, order in the rotation, his role, none of which were resolute at any point in his rookie season. In fact, Sensabaugh was first designated to the G League, then pulled out of the G League sporadically throughout the season, and these returns to the Jazz merely led to zero playing time, only the opportunity to spectate the games on the courtside bench. It wasn’t until mid-February, five months into the season, that Sensabaugh was installed into the playing rotation. The following 28 games were a deep struggle for Sensabaugh, a far cry from his illustrious body of work with Ohio State.

His sophomore campaign, of course, returned the confidence and awe that sparked it all. Top-end prospects enter the draft as teenagers or fresh 20-year-olds, not because there’s an enigmatic upside to drafting the youngest player available, rather, a recognition of a degree of talent that propels one in their inexperience to outpace the deeply experienced. The act of a 19-year-old college freshman, the youngest on the roster, unfamiliar to his teammates, unfamiliar to the coaching staff, unfamiliar to the new town he’s playing in, to earn rank as leader, to establish a reputation as the best player on the roster, is a bewildering circumstance invariably explicated by “talent”.

The scale of talent is measured in magnitude, the greatest talents identified with their slew of unprecedented box score performances, with emphasis to thresholds crossed as the youngest and/or first. Former MVP and two-time NBA champion Kevin Durant for instance, became the youngest in NBA history to win the scoring title at 21 years of age.

There is the analysis of athletic traits as well, observing a player’s foot speed, acceleration, strength, mobility, flexibility, and jumping ability. 4-time MVP, 4-time NBA champion, and all-time scoring leader LeBron James, instantly earned distinction as one of the greatest athletes upon his entrance into the league. The speed, strength, and flight LeBron presented at 6’9, 240+ pounds had no peers.

For Brice Sensabaugh, talent is contained principally in his scoring. He is not an unprecedented athlete, highlight clips do not feature one-hand jams, coast-to-coast blur-like sprints to the cup, nor extraordinary weakside blocks. The highlights, however, emphasize the fearlessness of Sensabaugh’s scoring craft. The midrange particularly is an area in which Sensabaugh’s talent shines unmistakably. In his active role as an off the bench play-finisher, the bulk of his field-goal attempts being catch-and-shoot, the exploration into his possessions as a creator is critical.

Contested half-spin fadeaway middies, deep pull-up threes off a ball screen, tween cross drives into effortless floaters, stutter rip drives into low gather layup finishes, pound-dribble stepback threes, off-hand hesi drives into bank floaters, all comfortably within the binds of Sensabaugh’s repertoire. These reserved sequences will in due course expand to an outspoken playstyle as he ascends to the forefront of a roster. This foresight, again, is only constructed in response to Sensabaugh’s unprecedented shooting efficiency (talent) as a sophomore.

As a ball-handler, an area of development for Sensabaugh both as a scorer and passer, Sensabaugh integrates keen hesi and punch dribbles through ball screens to create space and attack spots, a rather advanced and precision-based technique of shot creation that he’s grown in success with using. These dribble sequences afford Sensabaugh, and the Jazz’s offense overall the time necessary to create an open shot. Sensabaugh has done a good job jailing off his POA to the side of his body, holding the screen defender at his attention as he paces downhill, enabling his screener to slip to the basket uncontested, finally shoveling off the ball to said screener for an open bucket at the rim.

Smart defenses grow accustomed to Sensabaugh’s on-ball antics, as his instincts call for pull-up shooting in virtually every scenario, a consequential hinderance to his efficiency and utility. Either Sensabaugh defaults to overwhelmingly difficult middies, or, unfamiliar and trepid in his drives to the rim, is unable to finish at the basket (at an efficiency below league average). As familiar and instinctive as he is with slowing and accelerating pace of play, as well as utilizing his stocky, linebacker-esque weight to displace defenders with shoulder strikes to their chest, Sensabaugh struggles to employ either of those concepts effectively when opposed by rangy, towering rim protectors.

As defenses adapted, Sensabaugh quickly produced his own set of countermeasures—a nod to his quiet sense of intuition. Acknowledging the challenges in his non-transition rim-finishing, Sensabaugh leaned once more on his impeccable shooting touch, this time, channeling his talent in the form of floaters/runners. Floaters have been an excellent counter to the awaiting rim-protector. As the big is bound to protect the rim, Sensabaugh approaching can seize the in-between space from FT-line to basket with a swift floater.

Still, defenses haven’t quite adapted to Sensabaugh’s perimeter scoring talent. His shot focus is second to very few. The body of a defender does not disrupt his connection to a bucket as he rises to shoot. He has long grown accustomed to shooting off-the-dribble fadeaway pull-up jumpers amidst two to three crowding defenders (it is within these possessions his reported 6’11 wingspan has proven most valuable). He’s a 41% 3pt shooter on guarded C&S, far above league average, 36% 3pt off-the-dribble, also above league average, reaffirming these observations.

Fundamentally, a player of Sensabaugh’s archetype, play-finisher, is expected to be an effectual scorer off-the-catch, their contributions to the team's offense although confined principally to scoring nonetheless adds to winning basketball. Their shot diet unambiguous. Catch-and-shoot (C&S) threes. One-dribble pull-up threes. Attacking perimeter closeouts, driving layups and dunks, occasionally a pull-up middy. Decisive off-ball motions to puncture vulnerabilities within a defensive coverage (aptly named “Cut”; i.e. 45-cut, backdoor cut, face cut). These concepts apply to halfcourt possessions, but pull-up shooting expands to open-floor, transition possessions as well. Sensabaugh statistically has already mastered all aspects of off-the-catch three-point shooting. A 91st percentile jump-shooter across 71 games and 6.2 possessions a game. With a strong command of the fundamentals and talents in the advanced competencies, a path is open to Sensabaugh as early as this upcoming season to engage as a leading scoring option for the Utah Jazz.

In defiance of his exceptional scoring efficiency, Sensabaugh’s raw production proved restrained, a consequence of key impediments that have swelled to offensive debilitations. The first impediment, though weaker in correlation, is passing. Weak in correlation because one's wherewithal as a passer does not directly inhibit one from raking points, à la teammate Lauri Markkanen, or Hall-of-Famer Carmelo Anthony. Though it could be argued that these players represent outliers to the normality, with there being far more 25 point-per-game scorers who also averaged three-plus assists per game than the contrary.

Playing at small forward, Sensabaugh carries no direct responsibility to his team as a playmaker. A passer, yes, organizing and devising sequences to generate open looks for teammates, no. Therefore, expectations of Sensabaugh’s production in the assist column of a box score are conservatively low. Sensabaugh met this expectation in his first two years. Assuming however, that his scoring indeed does surge, and consequently his minutes and overall usage, there is an uncertainty that Sensabaugh will meet the concurrently rising responsibilities placed upon his passing and playmaking aptitude.

In the most basic sense, a deficient passer is inclined to alternate between committing turnovers (forfeiting the possession), or an arduous shot selection (burning possessions). A player with the tendency of committing turnovers in the attempt of passing will eventually face defenses that strongly encourage one to pass the ball, in the form of traps, digs, double-teams, zone coverage, man press, and so on. Each of these defensive concepts employ varied strategies to pin a ball-handler into coughing up the ball. A scorer incapable of surmounting these concepts will ultimately be phased out of on-ball usage. A player with a laborious shot selection remains far and few in between, and those who successfully transform these statistically low efficient shot types into ultra-efficient looks are fewer. Role players in this era are virtually barred from even attempting wildly off-the-dribble looks. Again, possessions are too valuable for teams to endeavor into low-reward, high-risk looks (long-twos most infamously). The aversion to this level of “risk” exacerbates on possessions that neglect open shooters along the arc, or an open man at the dunker spot. A playstyle that favors shooting over passing, irrespective of context, invariably decays the value of a player's scoring talent.

Rim-finishing is the second, yet most intimate impediment to Sensabaugh’s offense. An amalgamation of volume and half-court rim-finishing to be precise. Despite a bulky frame at 6’6, 235-lbs, a wingspan outstretched 6’11 long, Sensabaugh has been especially volatile converting at the basket. In respect to technical ability, there is no eminent shortcoming to call upon and identify as the crux of the matter. Rather, it is an issue of talent, athletic talent that is, disconnecting Sensabaugh from proper rim efficiency. The scarcity of material athletic talent within Sensabaugh is most evident in possessions he’s attacking downhill. Unafraid to swing his 235-lb, dense physical frame onto opponents as a means to space-creation, employing hardly shoulder bumps and arm bars, Sensabaugh seldom struggles generating a paint touch, if desired. These maneuvers however, only concern with beating the point of attack (POA), not the rim protector (low-man, screen-defender, whoever is responsible in that possession for guarding the rim). Overcoming rim-protectors derives from a combination of elevation, speed, and strength. To rise above a rim-protector, to rush past a rim-protector, or to muscle-out a rim-protector. Sensabaugh makes no issue utilizing his strength. Elevation and speed, however, are two facets of athleticism he does not possess. Hence, Sensabaugh approaches rim-protectors slowly at an under-the-rim trajectory, constrained to attempting incredibly complex, high-off-glass touch layups in order to get the ball over this defender, a shot type that requires a grade of precision and accuracy that is impractical to replicate with any sort of regularity. Sensabaugh, as an acutely aware scorer, has developed counters for this deficiency, employing beautiful touch floaters in the face of skying rim-protectors. Although, even with the inclusion of this perceptive counter, Sensabaugh falls exceedingly short of the statistical efficiency expected of a wing-scorer of his physical and technical talents at the rim.

The scarcity of volume in turn impedes his free-throw rate, a requisite to achieving 24+ point-per-game averages. Free-throw rate is the proportion of free-throw-attempts to field-goal attempts, the higher, the better. Sensabaugh, spanning back to high school, has consistently posted exceedingly low free-throw rates (FTr) in due to his heavy jump-shooting shot diet. There exists the archetype of jump-shooters who can draw fouls with their shooting form, specifically their method of rising quickly into their release, launching forward upon release, dramatically shifting their landing space and closing the area between themself and their defender, and upon landing jamming their body into the defender, drawing the shooting foul. This does not describe Sensabaugh’s shooting style. Sensabaugh will establish contact with a defender to then create space for a midrange/floater, but he has yet to show an intentionality of drawing a foul in these possessions. And with rim-attempts at a rarity, opportunities to improve his FTr are far and few between. Sensabaugh will need to build upon this aspect of his offense to eventually cross the 18-22ppg threshold.

With starting shooting guard vet Collin Sexton traded for the 30-year-old and rapidly declining center Jursif Nurkić, as well as starting point forward vet John Collins traded in return for 37-year-old Kevin Love and 33-year-old Kyle Anderson, two off-the-bench, salary-filler, contract-expiring assets, the Utah Jazz as an organization has finally presented Sensabaugh the opportunity to not only feature in their starting lineup, but to take on a prominent role as a starter. Alongside the pass-first second-year point-guard Collin Sexton, volatile combo guard Keyonte George, exemplary play-finisher forward Lauri Markkanen, and the skying rim-protector Walter Kessler, Sensabaugh fills a vital void as a creative, confident, efficient, shot-creating wing. The addition of the renowned 6’9 18-year-old rookie Ace Bailey will create an atmosphere of competition, but Sensabaugh nonetheless dominates. A talent of his caliber always prevails regardless of the surrounding circumstances, hurdles, and impediments.

As the lottery order stands at a complete 180 from expectations—a play-in team in possession of the #1 overall pick, while a team failing to win 20 games in an 82 game season left outside the top 5, establishing who’s the best talent available is imperative. Struggling franchises like the Washington Wizards, New Orleans Pelicans, and Brooklyn Nets must identify who’s best of the remaining.

The He Is Not A Hooper’s NBA Draft Big Board is arranged with NBA translation as the point of emphasis. Talent is essential, yes, but as an obsessed fan of the Houston Rockets, I’ve witnessed the shortcomings of talent by itself. Talent alone cannot overcome NBA physicality, game speed, and its ever growing complexity. The prospects that translate the best from college/international into the NBA possess a set of baseline skills that then expand with NBA experience and development.

The particulars that encompass “baseline skills” vary by role and position. For guards, it is a pull-up three *and* a dependable handle is what I consider a baseline skill. For Wings/Forwards, it is a catch-and-shoot three, and/or respectable downhill creation. For Bigs, it’s screening and rolling. There are always exceptions to the rules, a handful a prospects so talented in specific aspects that the absence of baseline skills is effectively ignored. Those prospects are explained as “raw”.

To the best of my ability, I’ve followed this philosophy to order this cycle of prospects from strongest to weakest, those most likely to succeed to those most likely to fizzle out.

SYMBOL GLOSSARY

Roles

Primary: Initiators of the offense. Typically whoever is taking the ball up the floor, directing the offense. Primary ball-handlers usually run a relatively high volume of PnR (e.g., Jayson Tatum, Fred Van Vleet, Donovan Mitchell).

Secondary: Secondary initiators on offense. Increased off-ball scoring, with scaled down ball-handling duties (e.g., DeJounte Murray, Jamal Murray, De’Aaron Fox).

Shot Creator: Specializes in high-volume isolation and PnR perimeter/downhill scoring (e.g., Luka Doncic, Tyrese Haliburton, Jalen Brunson).

Play Finisher: Off ball scorers with minimal roles as facilitators (e.g., Trey Murphy III, Michael Porter Jr, Cam Whitmore).

C&S: Perimeter-dominant scorers who shoot from a standstill (e.g., Eric Gordon, Brook Lopez, OG Anunoby).

Movement Shooter: Perimeter dominant scorers with the ability to score off-screens (e.g., Bogdan Bogdanovic, Luke Kennard, Sam Merrill).

Roll Big - Bigs whose offense is overwhelmingly assisted, generating offense as rollers and cutters (e.g., Clint Capela, Daniel Gafford, Nicholas Claxton).

Versatile Big: Bigs whose offense can scale outside the paint, by way of perimeter scoring or post-play (e.g., Chet Holmgren, Karl Anthony-Towns, Kristaps Porzingis).

With exception to the number one and number two prospects of this draft class, Cooper Flagg and Dylan Harper respectively, each prospect in the lottery has been reshuffled. The top ten generally remains intact, with three new entrances and a bit of rearranging.

Notable Changes

• Kasparas Jakucionis - Fighting Illini’s 6’6 point-guard, now sits at 9th, moving out from third overall. It was the rather disappointing stretch of games by other prospects, Danny Wolf, VJ Edgecombe, Tre Johnson, in January that left Kasparas at third, than Kasparas himself carving out a definitive place in the draft hierarchy. February nonetheless, has not been kind to Kasparas. This month he’s averaging 13.6 points, 5.1 rebounds, 3.4 assists, and 3.1 turnovers per game, shooting a dreadful 21.6% from three on an overall 55.8% TS. The absence of a defined athletic trait has become unavoidable to notice. Without his three-point shot falling, turnovers amassing, his defense slipping from what was an already fairly questionable aspect of his game, and above all, the upward trend of other prospects, Kasparas now finds himself mid-to-late lottery. Sheer size and assist production will keep him firmly within the lottery, not to mention his 2pt field-goal percentage has remained resilient through the stretch of bad games (61.4% in February).

• VJ Edgecombe - 6’4 Baylor shooting-guard shoots up to 5th, after placing right outside the top ten in January, at 11th. While Edgecombe shot an impressive 38.9% 3pt leading up to February, with an arguably more impressive 9.8 box plus-minus (BPM), there was an uncertainty lingering about Edgecombe’s offense. As the best athlete of this class, or at the very least, the most visually tantalizing one, Edgecombe did not produce the style nor volume of drives to the basket in a halfcourt setting 99th percentile guard-athletes historically do. Edgecombe makes habit of gathering as he approaches the paint, relying solely on his athletic traits to carry him from free-throw line to basket. He’s converted a fair amount of tough floaters in this manner, but more times than not the result is an awkward, stunted drive. These early pick ups reduce opportunities to draw fouls, and low free-throw rates are uncanny among high-end guard-athlete prospects who establish sustained rotation success or better in the NBA.

  Seemingly, an internal switch has flicked on for Edgecombe. Driving volume has increased, the 2pt efficiency has sharpened, and his free-throw rate has exploded. Defenders guarding in isolation stand no chance keeping in front, an advantage Edgecombe has become more comfortable exploiting game over game. Despite the poor 3pt shooting (28.6% 3pt), this month has highlighted his strengths in ways not expressed prior.

• Derik Queen - The 6’10 big from Maryland offers fun scoring versatility in the frontcourt, best utilized at the power-forward position. Queen originally was scouted as a center—at Montverde he played at center next to power-forward and Gatorade National Player of the Year Cooper Flagg. Currently with the Maryland Terrapins, Queen continues to play at center, accompanied by Julian Reese, Power Forward (and brother of women’s basketball global superstar Angel Reese). Queen, listed at 6’10, likely 6’9, lacks the prerequisite height, wingspan, and athleticism to successfully play NBA center. Queen is inconsistent as a roller and play-finisher, most comfortable creating his own shots. It is best that the shot-creating, midrange shooting, 6’9 big plays at the four, freeing the 5 for a true play-finisher, and freeing himself from responsibilities he has no desire of undertaking. At the 4, Queen can be incredibly dangerous if the perimeter shooting develops. His footwork and handle as a freshman ranks among the best of big men prospects.

SYMBOL GLOSSARY

Roles

Primary: Initiators of the offense. Typically whoever is taking the ball up the floor, directing the offense. Primary ball-handlers usually run a relatively high volume of PnR (e.g., Jayson Tatum, Fred Van Vleet, Donovan Mitchell).

Secondary: Secondary initiators on offense. Increased off-ball scoring, with scaled down ball-handling duties (e.g., DeJounte Murray, Jamal Murray, De’Aaron Fox).

Shot Creator: Specializes in high-volume isolation and PnR perimeter/downhill scoring (e.g., Luka Doncic, Tyrese Haliburton, Jalen Brunson).

Play Finisher: Off ball scorers with minimal roles as facilitators (e.g., Trey Murphy III, Michael Porter Jr, Cam Whitmore).

C&S: Perimeter-dominant scorers who shoot from a standstill (e.g., Eric Gordon, Brook Lopez, OG Anunoby).

Movement Shooter: Perimeter dominant scorers with the ability to score off-screens (e.g., Bogdan Bogdanovic, Luke Kennard, Sam Merrill).

Roll Big - Bigs whose offense is overwhelmingly assisted, generating offense as rollers and cutters (e.g., Clint Capela, Daniel Gafford, Nicholas Claxton).

Versatile Big: Bigs whose offense can scale outside the paint, by way of perimeter scoring or post-play (e.g., Chet Holmgren, Karl Anthony-Towns, Kristaps Porzingis).

Now competing against collegiate talent, their skillsets have thoroughly been put to the test, weaknesses and strengths distinctly outlined, while players prior to the season flying under the scouting radar have risen to the forefront. While Flagg, Harper, and Bailey with certainty have proven their merit, the remaining players from their high school class have yet to establish an unequivocal path to prolonged NBA success, although many have the framework to do so.

This first edition of my NBA Big Board is arranged solely on the evaluation of prospect, not fit for team, and is subject to rearrangement as seen fit.

SYMBOL GLOSSARY

Roles

Primary: Initiators of the offense. Typically whoever is taking the ball up the floor, directing the offense. Primary ball-handlers usually run a relatively high volume of PnR (e.g., Jayson Tatum, Fred Van Vleet, Donovan Mitchell).

Secondary: Secondary initiators on offense. Increased off-ball scoring, with scaled down ball-handling duties (e.g., DeJounte Murray, Jamal Murray, De’Aaron Fox).

Shot Creator: Specializes in high-volume isolation and PnR perimeter/downhill scoring (e.g., Luka Doncic, Tyrese Haliburton, Jalen Brunson).

Play Finisher: Off ball scorers with minimal roles as facilitators (e.g., Trey Murphy III, Michael Porter Jr, Cam Whitmore).

C&S: Perimeter-dominant scorers who shoot from a standstill (e.g., Eric Gordon, Brook Lopez, OG Anunoby).

Movement Shooter: Perimeter dominant scorers with the ability to score off-screens (e.g., Bogdan Bogdanovic, Luke Kennard, Sam Merrill).

Roll Big - Bigs whose offense is overwhelmingly assisted, generating offense as rollers and cutters (e.g., Clint Capela, Daniel Gafford, Nicholas Claxton).

Versatile Big: Bigs whose offense can scale outside the paint, by way of perimeter scoring or post-play (e.g., Chet Holmgren, Karl Anthony-Towns, Kristaps Porzingis).

PROFILE 

Rob Dillingham epitomizes the essence of “scoring guard.” An eccentric offensive weapon that can create and score from any area of the floor. At 6’1, 165-lbs, however, Dillingham cannot shake off the predispositions of the small guard.  

Size is paramount when evaluating Dillingham’s physical/athletic profile. Despite other premier athletic qualities, size takes a big piece of the pie. There will always be a natural limitation on what Dillingham can physically do on the court at 6’1.

To his advantage, Dillingham’s size allows for maneuverability through narrow spacing, notably downhill. This complements his footspeed and shiftiness, as he’s able to take on aggressive driving angles, using his quick-twitch mobility to create separation and score. 

In all aspects, Dillingham plays at a rapid pace. Footspeed, shot release, passing velocity, ball-handling, processing, Dillingham is all about playing at a quick pace. For guards, and particularly undersized guards, speed is the greatest asset available. Lower to the ground, Dillingham can worm through bigger defenders to the rim for clean looks.  

With a sharp first step, explosive verticality, and quick change of direction, Dillingham has successfully merged the three to amplify his advantage creation. These qualities suggest sufficient strength in his quad muscles and hip extensors (respective of height). Both are critical in producing explosivity vertically and at ground level. 

In-air, Dillingham has phenomenal body control, indicating sufficient core-strength and dexterity of the upper extremities. Dexterity is exhibited through his ball-handling, capable of executing many intricate dribbling sequences to create spacing from defenders. There's also his rim-finishing, Dillingham being one of the best in the class on touch shots. He possesses one of, if not the deepest, finishing bags, capable of executing layups from every angle, regardless of body position. 

What has truly separated Rob Dillingham from other prototypical athletic scoring guards is his cognitive agility. His processing and creativity offensively are atypical among guards with his scoring talent. Has an in-depth understanding of space, defensive tendencies, and court mapping. This degree of game processing grants him the privilege of scaling between scoring guard to point guard, both in a roster and play-style sense. It underlines Dillingham value on the floor outside of scoring, a quality many scoring guards lack. 

In a technical aspect, Dillingham operates in anything but a traditional sense. His body swings every which way as he dribbles, his feet sway as he raises to his jumper, and he doesn’t care much for how his body aligns with the basket upon his gather, so long as its chest aligns on release. It’s impressive how Dillingham maintained elite scoring efficiency despite his wild approach, but it also explains his prior seasons leading to Kentucky. OTE, Donda Academy, EYBL, FIBA, Dillingham’s off-the-cuff technique was typically the downfall of his game. Beyond his scoring ability, the absence of technical discipline also debilitated his defense. 

OFFENSE 

Dillingham averaged 15.2/3.1/3.9 on 55.9% eFG | 59.5% TS, through 32 games. He’s one of ten freshmen to average 15+ points per game this season, and the sole true freshman to average 15+ points on ≥55% eFG. Dillingham earned SEC 6MOY of the year for these achievements, coming off the bench for Kentucky in 31 of 32 games. He was Kentucky’s second-leading scorer, second-leading in assists, while fifth-leading in minutes.  

Dillingham’s role and responsibilities scaled within games but was utilized primarily as an initiator and premier ball-handler. On-ball, Dillingham frequently ran the PnR, converting an exceedingly efficient 1.000 PPP (points per possession), on 3.8 possessions per game. Dillingham was all about exploiting any space defenders deferred.  

Versus any form of drop, Dillingham favored using ball-screens going to his left, proceeding with a pull-up jumper. If it were a high ball-screen, Dillingham shot the three, on side PnRs, he would defer to middies or floaters. What made this so effective is his near-instant shot release. Any slower, and he’d have to deal with lengthy contests. By the time he reaches his release point, defenders are just getting their hands up. It’s a small window, but he’s exceeded threading the needle more times than not. An elite scorer versus drop coverage. 

To counter Dillingham’s pull-up jumpers, defenses began hard hedging against Kentucky ball screens, immediately taking away his space coming off the screen. This was highly effective, as it not only removed his jumper, but took him out of rhythm, leading to turnovers or rushed shots. The hedging screen-defender had the advantage of size and proximity, their physicality overwhelming for the 165-lb Dillingham. Kentucky had a few counters to this; one being transmuting a simple ball-screen into a double drag for open Dillingham threes. Nevertheless, hedging forced Dillingham to attempt difficult progressions, both as passer and scorer. As a potential NBA point guard, it’s important Dillingham can identify, discern, and counter the multitude of coverages thrown at him. There were a few possessions Dillingham rejected the screen upon identifying the defense hedging, opting to attack his POA, resulting in quality buckets. An example of a counter he will need to expand on to maintain his effectiveness as a PnR operator. 

In respect to other play types, Dillingham had minimal field-goal attempts out of isos, with only 35 possessions total. The possessions, however, give insight into his shot creation off the dribble, specifically how he crafts advantages with his handle. Dillingham’s bag is deep. He’s a creative, flashy dribbler, but operates out of functionality. The hesis, tweens, crossovers, behind-the-backs, all serve the purpose of creating much-needed spacing for him to score. At 6’1, he isn’t scoring over defenders, and at 165-lbs, he isn’t bullying anyone to establish his own space. Finesse and speed are his game. Akin to the best iso scorers in the league, Dillingham creates space by persistently attacking the outside top foot of his defender, prying open a driving lane. He has a myriad of techniques to set this up, but it always leads to attacking that outside top foot. Dillingham didn’t have much issue blowing by his initial defender but did run into problems against the low man in help. A common weakness among undersized guards. 

Dillingham has shown phenomenal touch in the paint, from his floaters 8-16ft out, to his touch layups at the rim. He has been incredibly efficient in the halfcourt, shooting 52.9% fg on floaters, and 58% fg on layups. Trae Young and De’Aaron Fox are the only few guard prospects that even come close to shooting 50% fg on floaters. Tyrese Maxey, Ja Morant, SGA, all shot ~40% fg on floaters (halfcourt) in their college days. It's not far-fetched to say Dillingham has some of the best touch among prospects historically, at least in the past decade. His touch off glass, the underhanded finishes, the baseline floaters, the makes off balance, it’s uncommon to see an undersized guard finish to the extent Dillingham has throughout an entire collegiate season. 

Conversely, Dillingham over-relied on this shot making ability, neglecting better reads. His transition offense highlights this problem better than any other facet of his offense. It’s as though Dillingham is given too much space to manage and self-implodes voluntarily. His rim finishing plummets in transition, from 58% fg in the halfcourt, to 45% fg, and his perimeter shooting nosedives, from 47.1% 3pt in the halfcourt, to 28% 3pt.  

Dillingham wants to get out in transition. If one of Kentucky’s playmakers grabs the defensive rebound, Dillingham is pushing full sprint to receive an outlet pass, and finish at the rim. If he nabs the defensive rebound, his pace may slow, but he is still looking for creases to attack and force pressure at the rim. The concept is great. Take advantage of an unset, unorganized defense, and get to the cup. Issues arise when Dillingham pushes ahead, even though there is no advantage present. Too many possessions 6’1 Dillingham is taking on multiple defenders at the rim, dashing downhill, when there’s no feasible avenue to score. It crippled his scoring, and more importantly, stunted potential Kentucky momentum. Court awareness, self-awareness, must improve.  

As an off-ball scorer, Dillingham’s production was nothing short of elite. 1.311 PPP (points per possession) on spot-up shooting, ranking 97th percentile across D-1 players. Between his ability to effectively attack closeouts (50% 2pt), and his automatic shot making ability as a catch-and-shooter (47.7% 3pt), Dillingham was just as a threat away from the ball as on it.  

Shot making was not the only aspect that made Dillingham effective off the catch. His readiness and preparation for scoring were just as significant. He understood where to position and reposition himself off-ball, consistently reorganizing himself throughout the court to align himself in passing vision of the ball-handler. This not only encouraged ball-movement but continually spaced the floor.  

Off-ball movement is an underrated skill set for guards. It’s a skill that can be difficult to introduce at the NBA level, a pace of play much faster and unrepenting than lower leagues. In the case of Dillingham, off-ball movement emphasizes his offensive scalability and malleability within roster/lineup construction. There’s no obligation to pari him with a specific class of ball-handler, as Dillingham meshes with both high/low-usage guards. 

PLAYMAKING:  

Playmaking was an intriguing facet of Dillingham’s offense. A willing passer, although a score-first guard, Dillingham was Kentucky’s primary ball-handler in his featured minutes. He was given the responsibility of taking the ball up the floor, running the PnR, resetting the offense after blown up plays, and initiating sets in the halfcourt. 

This season especially, Dillingham displayed strong synergies/reciprocity with his PnR partners, in spite of weak screen setting and raw scoring ability from his bigs. He worked around it, playing to their advantage as vertical spacers with a battery of lobs. A versatile passer with his strong hand, Dillingham’s only limit is his size. Can execute skip, pocket, swing, lob, dump, out, overhead, and touch passes. Can make each of these passes live-dribble. 

Dillingham’s passing accuracy is fine, but can be overzealous passing through difficult, awkward windows. His overall passing velocity is strong, but both his passing speed and accuracy take a decline when tightly defended, typically as he’s making passes from the paint. 

Dillingham has done an excellent job manipulating help-defenders with his eyes, freeing up an extra split second for his teammate to score. Best examples of this are on dump offs, as Dillingham must bait the low man into guarding ball, freeing up his teammates in the dunker spot. He’s also done this on skip passes, notably in transition. 

Turnovers from Dillingham derive from either being outmuscled or overplaying his hand as a shot creator. He isn’t a sloppy player, with a 2:1 assist to turnover ratio, but he does fall into sloppy moments with the occasional over-dribbling.  

DEFENSE 

Defense is the area of Dillingham’s game that has left most trepidant around projecting him as a high-end prospect. Preceding his technical, cognitive ability, size is his most glaring weakness. There’s no defensive versatility offered by a 6’1, slender guard. On paper, he’s physically a liability against every NBA player, certainly starters, 1-5. So, while there may not be a demand to pair a specific guard archetype next to Dillingham offensively, teams will undoubtedly look to add size in the backcourt to shore up his defensive deficiencies. 

Athletically there’s bright spots. Sharp lateral agility and hip mobility, allowing him to track ball-handlers quite well in isolation. This provides a foundation for an organization to build his defensive competency from, ground up.  

Outside of his athletic charm, the positives around his defense run dry. Yes, he’s not afraid to defend in space but also can abandon his team attempting to create a play 1 on 1, 30-40ft out. His recovery defense exacerbates this issue, as he has no recovery defense. 

He’s equipped with a slim frame, but navigating screens persists to be an over demanding task. Struggles to effectively fight through screens, dying upon contact of the screener. He could go under but doesn’t have the length to then closeout if the ball-handler goes for the three. He could go over but did a poor job the entire season trying to recover once beat. Switching as a 6’1 guard is a very tall task (no pun intended). 

Off-ball troubles worsen but are inversely simpler to fix. Fundamentally he is absent in his role as an off-ball defender. Constant ball-watching allows for baseline cutters and open off-screen actions. Doesn’t particularly focus on guarding with anticipation, very reactive. Doesn’t play passing lanes, doesn’t look to get involved defensively.  

Tends to sag quite deep off his matchups off-ball, which is a big mistake for a defender with such poor recovery skills. It creates easier possessions for his man to attack off-the-catch. By sagging off, Dillingham isn’t there to disrupt the pass, and he isn’t present to apply any resistance before his man establishes speed. There isn’t any evident purpose in the depth in which he sags, but only to ball watch.  

When Dillingham does defend with a purpose off-ball, he often forgets to try after the defensive rebound, quickly shifting his focus into transition offense. With his man unguarded, opponents easily generate second chance opportunities. This specific habit cost Kentucky a couple of close games. 

Watching Dillingham defensively, it’s clear he’s established poor defensive habits in previous contexts. He has flashes of effort, and generating stops, but on a technical, cognitive, and physical basis, Dillingham is objectively extremely far away from being evaluated as even a neutral defender. In the NBA it will worsen, and under the wrong system, it could morph into unrepairable.  

The major theme for Dillingham defensively is a lack of discipline on even the most fundamental aspects of defense. He’s immature. One could hope his competitive spirit convinces him that learning and applying defense adds value to his game, as teams aren’t eager to play a prospect of his stature meaningful minutes otherwise. 

VERDICT: 

Tantalizing offensively with seriously worrying defensive traits. Still, a top 10 prospect in this class and comfortably top 5 if there’s confidence around his defense improving. An incredibly scalable guard that understands which role he needs to play offensively. An attractive prospect for teams looking to invest in risk for the chance of significant upside. 

PROFILE:

Matas Buzelis is a complex scoring wing, whose scope ranges far beyond the quotidian 3&D prospect. He’s a tall, slim-framed wing who favors ball-manipulation over brute athleticism to create plays on both ends of the floor.  At 6’10, 209-lbs, the scoring concepts Buzelis has developed throughout the season has been impressive, utilizing handle and pace to exploit cracks in defenses. But while the ball-handling is attractive, athletically, it’s uncertain how Buzelis fares at the NBA level.

Respective to his playstyle — an off-the-dribble, downhill, interior creator; managing physicality and self-organization is imperative. His high center of gravity, sluggish burst, and unconvincing upper body strength, make achieving those objectives on a consistent basis impracticable.

Buzelis, to his benefit, has the creativity and ingenuity to implement pace and handle in live-dribble conditions to generate an edge, whereas the vast majority of tall wings do not.

Buzelis’ greatest advantage at the moment is his live processing. His proprioception, cognitive agility, offensively, are much further along than counterparts his size. This has earned him more reps as a secondary, sometimes primary initiator on offense.

Quad strength has been an underrated asset of Buzelis’. He’s an underrated dunker in general, making a few posters this season. His ability to generate leg power both off-the-dribble and off-standstill has been awesome to see. He’s comfortable utilizing both one-legged, two-legged takeoffs, which speaks to his adaptability and rhythmicity on the fly. He struggles generating lift against contact, suggesting weaker calf/hamstring muscles. This would also correlate with his negligible burst and footspeed. 

Where Buzelis is uncomfortable taking on contact, he is however, comfortable initiating it. With an emphasis on pace as a ball-handler, Buzelis is constantly surrounded by bodies. He loves using shoulder bumps and arm bars at the midrange to create extra space for pull-ups. He’s not afraid of post-ups either, using his 6’10 body against smaller defenders to execute simple mismatches.

His upper body strength is typical for 19 year-old prospects, particularly tall, thin wings. With NBA training, Buzelis will become stronger, organically. His body is far from full development.

Physical agility is the larger pitfall for Buzelis. Ineffectual reactive strength, foot speed, limited flexibility, weak core, inadequate strength. It isn’t sustainable for a starting NBA wing, even G League wing; Hence his deep shooting inefficiencies and defensive inconsistencies. Strength as previously mentioned, is easily scalable. But it’s difficult to project a player who lacks any semblance of burst to finally develop it in the NBA. Buzelis more than likely will always have to work around that in an effort to create advantages.

OFFENSE:

Through 32 games in the G League, Buzelis is averaging 12.6/6.5/1.9 on 51.6% TS. Alongside Ron Holland, a fellow 2024 draft prospect and projected top-10 pick, Buzelis’ played majority off-ball, exhibiting that of a 3&D. When Holland incurred a season-ending injury, Buzelis increased his on-ball reps, playing that of a shot-creating wing. Post-ups, PnR, isolations, Buzelis was afforded more on-ball usage.

Buzelis has struggled a lot this season with his perimeter shooting. At Sunrise Christian Academy, Buzelis was shooting 43.1% 3pt on over 100 attempts. It’s surprising to now see those 3pt shooting splits dip all the way below 30%, at a dismal 26.3% 3pt on over 110 attempts. Contested or uncontested, three-pointers from an NBA range are not falling for Buzelis. His shot diet consists primarily of C&S (86.8% of his attempts to be exact), so poor shot quality isn’t the cause of the major shooting slump. His shot form likely needs adjustment, specifically in his energy transfer from countermovement to jump. Lacks power, which affects his shooting touch.

Buzelis can shoot however. He’s shooting very well (47.2% fg), on off-the-dribble middies. These are analytically considered the worst shot in basketball, and Buzelis is draining them with great success. Contested, smothered, stepbacks, Buzelis is doing it all from a creation and efficiency standpoint. The disparity between mid-range and 3pt production suggests a technical error in his energy transfer from deep. The good news is this can be adjusted with a quality NBA shooting coach. Countless examples of players who lost their touch and regained it under the appropriate coaching.

Buzelis as a ball=handler is intriguing to watch, but there’s still a ways to go in his execution. Despite positive initial processing, Buzelis has been a fairly bad scorer on-ball. In the PnR, Buzelis is comfortable attacking with, or rejecting the screen, can dribble penetrate with his left or right hand, and has been very patient in getting to his spots. But he’s only shooting 0.556 PPP, 34.5% fg, in the PnR. He’s had a very tough time finishing through contact, whether it’s floaters or layups. He doesn’t take any threes coming out the PnR. This simply goes back to lackluster physical agility. 

Yet, the live-dribble creation gives hope he’ll bring it all together. Utilizes an array of dribble moves, from the hang dribble, hostage dribble, drag hesi, tween hesi, crossovers, full spins, the euro-step, Buzelis has an impressive bag. He’s creative, and willing to experiment in the moment to create scoring windows.

He has the aptitude to be a shot-creating wing, but it’s proven too difficult for him at the moment. His body doesn’t hold up with grown, professional athletes. His playstyle of pace has its advantages, but at the cost of marginal spacing. Meaning he’s always surrounded by defenders, forcing the issue of physical conditioning and overall shotmaking.

At the rim, Buzelis has been very inconsistent, alarming for a player of his size. Overall, he’s shooting 57.2% fg at the rim, but 47.6% on layups. This is a similar issue to another thin-framed shot-creating prospect in a previous class, Brandon Miller. Both struggled finishing at the rim on drives, either stemming from an absence of ball control when off-balance, poor verticality through contact (causes troublesome scoring windows), or inconsistent touch, specifically with the off-hand. Buzelis is experiencing all three. The first two are a matter of strength, while the third deals with hand/forearm dexterity. 

The same issues he’s faced in the PnR, he suffers in isolation. His athletic deficiencies, burst for example, becomes amplified, as he’s now without screens to get a beat on his defender. Not to mention, with minimal spacing, he’s shooting tough, contested jumpers. Rarely does he shoot iso threes. On-ball scoring hasn’t come easy for Buzelis.

Surprisingly, Buzelis has quite a bit of success from the post, shooting an efficient, 51.7% fg. Out the low post, Buzelis has done a great job targeting size mismatches, getting physical, and scoring in the paint. If he can’t generate the paint touch, he’s been more than comfortable deferring to post spin fades for a bucket. He’s also experimented a bit attacking face-up, taking advantage of his height for quick pull-up middies.

As a wing, Buzelis’ production off-ball as a play-finisher is as, if not more important than his capability as a shot-creator. More than likely, Buzelis will spend his first couple of seasons in the NBA as a play-finisher, rather than a primary//secondary ball-handler.

As an off-ball wing, Buzelis’ 3pt shooting woes continue, shooting a mere 29.3% on C&S. C&S are the bulk of Buzelis 3pt volume, so it’s disheartening to see the dropoff in efficiency from his senior year to now, with the G League. Buzelis becoming a 40% 3pt shooter in the NBA as he once was with Sunrise Christian seems very unlikely, but 29.3% 3pt also seems like a drastic overcorrection. His 3pt shooting should stabilize around league average with time. Tall wings have historically struggled shooting from NBA range in their teenage years, eventually finding their rhythm from their 3rd season on.

Aside from his perimeter shooting, Buzelis has been effective on the interior, attacking downhill off-the-catch. The extra momentum gained from stampeding the catch allows Buzelis shift focus to his finishing, rather than space-creation. His 2pt efficiency is night and day between his on-ball reps and off-ball. He’s shooting 50% fg on spot-up twos, 79.4% 2pt on cuts, and 58.9% 2pt in transition.

In general his scoring looks much smoother off-ball, relieved of the burden of shot creation as a 6’10 wing. The handle, pace, ball-manipulation, all look further polished off-ball. He’s been much better suited as an interior play-finisher rather than a 3-level ball-handling wing.

All in all, NBA teams should bank on Buzelis’ rarities: Functional, creative, intuitive, handle at 6’10 with midrange and perimeter shooting upside. His scalability offers a safety net_, as there’s a role for him no matter how the on-ball usage pans out.

On top of the scoring potential, Buzelis has real connective passing capabilities, amplified by his proficient live-dribble processing. Finds cutters and open shooters with ease. Especially in transition. Playmaking isn’t advanced, but connector skills respective to his position are incredibly valuable.

DEFENSE:

Buzelis has an interesting defensive profile. Where he lacks physically and athletically, his cognitive and technical agility makes up for it in a few important areas. As is, Buzelis physically can’t handle aggressive, strong, initiated contact, post-ups for example, leaving him a liability on matchups against bigger power forwards. He has no issue however, initiating contact. Buzelis in fact has found great success playing physically against drives to spur ball-pressure, taking ball-handlers out of rhythm. If he can initiate the contact, Buzelis becomes quite the impactful defender.

Athletically, Buzelis intrigues with subtle verticality and lateral mobility. His athletic feats aren’t imposing, but they’re sufficient to the extent of effectively defending other wings. He lacks the explosiveness and twitch to defend smaller guards, especially out on the perimeter. Speed also becomes an issue as well, which is only amplified by his lackluster recovery defense. Buzelis defends at his best against straight line drives, in which he leverages his body and unilateral mobility to cut off and deter lanes. Against craftier, shiftier ball-handlers, Buzelis really struggles tracking, staying in front. Doesn’t have the hip mobility to easily flip his hips at moment’s notice. Buzelis has moments where he’ll make a full outside spin to change the direction he’s shading, instead of simply flipping his hips. It’s only happened a few times, but it demonstrates where he’s at currently as far as hip mobility/flexibility.

His defensive weaknesses compound in the PnR. He’s has done a pretty poor job navigating screens. He much prefers to switch onto the screener, shying away from fighting/navigating over top of the screen to stay on the ball-handler. His effort against screens comes across as lackluster for how often he dies on the screen, and how infrequently Buzelis looks to recover once beaten. If the screener is ghosting, slipping, tagging, Buzelis is fine. Having to fight through a traditional pick is where Buzelis completely falls apart. On top of poor technique, Buzelis doesn’t effectively communicate with the screen defender (his teammate) when/if he’s switching, and his timing on switches often leaves one of the two offensive players in the two-man action open. 

There isn’t significant evidence suggesting Buzelis could become a switch defender in the league. Doesn’t have the length (wingspan) or athleticism, and his current reps leave much to be desired. He’s made a far greater impact as an interior defender, weakside rim protector. He’s a wing that teams would like to keep off-ball, away from screens. 

Off-ball, Buzelis has clear positive upside. Averaging 1.8 blocks per game, Buzelis has shown incredible agility contesting shots, both at the rim and against jumpers. He’s an incredibly active low-man, always looking for opportunities to make plays weakside. 

Because of his lack of wingspan, precision is fundamental in generating blocks and steals on a consistent basis. He doesn’t have the physiological margins Wemby, Claxton, or Holmgren have to be late on rotations or contests. It’s critical he executes the right way, at the right time. And he generally does. His spatial awareness, feel for rhythm, and anticipation, all merge together to make this possible. 

On the other hand, Buzelis can be a heavy ball-watcher, surrendering backdoor and curl cuts. Buzelis’ recovery defense is fairly weak, as he tends to give up on plays after he’s been beat. Seemingly stems from a lack of confidence in his athletic range. Doesn’t bother making the effort as he knows more than likely he’s not quick nor explosive enough to recover the lost ground in time.

VERDICT:

A clear top 10 prospect, Buzelis’ skillset makes for star potential. His ability to find ways to score in spite of athletic and physical deficiencies is unique and appealing. While his defense has much room for improvement, the defensive playmaking provides hope in a better future. An incredibly compelling prospect for teams looking for upside players with size and offensive versatility.

With March Madness around the corner, the climax and finale of college hoops, it’s a great time to update the NBA Draft Big Board Guide for 2024. 2024 has been widely regarded as a weak class, especially in comparison to the previous class of 2023, featuring Victor Wembanyama, Amen Thompson, Brandon Miller, and Dereck Lively.

While 2024 lacks the game-breaking, generational prospects of 2023, the talent is nonetheless there. This draft guide outlines those talents/skillsets in a digestible, fun manner.

KEY

Roles

Primary: Initiators of the offense. Typically whoever is taking the ball up the floor, directing the offense. Primary ball-handlers usually run a relatively high volume of PnR (e.g., Jayson Tatum, Fred Van Vleet, Donovan Mitchell).

Secondary: Secondary initiators on offense. Increased off-ball scoring, with scaled down ball-handling duties (e.g., DeJounte Murray, Jamal Murray, De’Aaron Fox).

Shot Creator: Specializes in high-volume isolation and PnR perimeter/downhill scoring (e.g., Luka Doncic, Tyrese Haliburton, Jalen Brunson).

Play Finisher: Off ball scorers with minimal roles as facilitators (e.g., Trey Murphy III, Michael Porter Jr, Cam Whitmore).

C&S: Perimeter-dominant scorers who shoot from a standstill (e.g., Eric Gordon, Brook Lopez, OG Anunoby).

Movement Shooter: Perimeter dominant scorers with the ability to score off-screens (e.g., Bogdan Bogdanovic, Luke Kennard, Sam Merrill).

Roll Big - Bigs whose offense is overwhelmingly assisted, generating offense as rollers and cutters (e.g., Clint Capela, Daniel Gafford, Nicholas Claxton).

Versatile Big: Bigs whose offense can scale outside the paint, by way of perimeter scoring or post-play (e.g., Chet Holmgren, Karl Anthony-Towns, Kristaps Porzingis).

Skillset

Shot-Making: The ability to convert jumpers off-the-dribble, and/or score efficiently from three, on volume (e.g., Devin Booker, Cam Johnson).

Rim Pressure: Non-Centers elevating pressure on defenses to protect the rim when on-ball (e.g., Ja Morant and Giannis Antetokounmpo). For centers, it’s the efficiency as rollers and cutters (e.g., Jarrett Allen and Anthony Davis).

Touch: The application of hand dexterity, wrist mobility, rhythm, and proprioception, conjointly. Best identified when shooting floaters and contested layups (e.g., Stephen Curry and Kyrie Irving).

Playmaking: Facilitating an offense by way of making simple reads, or creating open shots for teammates by leveraging shot gravity (e.g., Trae Young and Tyus Jones).

Efficiency: Non-centers shooting ≥52% eFG, and/or ≥58% TS. Centers shooting ≥58% eFG.

Wingspan: Players whose wingspan measures ≥3 inches longer than their height in shoes.

Defense: Players who do not project as liabilities as both individual or team defenders.

Athleticism: Those who create advantages with their athleticism. Athleticism is a weighted combination of strength, speed, burst, flexibility, mobility, and coordination.

PROFILE:

Kel’el Ware is a promising defensive prospect with an unclear future offensively. At 7’0, 242-lbs, Ware’s biggest advantage is his size, compounded by his athleticism. Based on near-instant production (at least defensively) from previous thin-framed bigs (Dereck Lively, Evan Mobley, Chet Holmgren), tacking on weight is not a priority in Ware’s early development. His timing, positioning, and footwork are more consequential to early production than his progression in size.

Athletically, Ware is a dynamic, explosive prospect. An above-the-rim big that’s persistently a lob threat. His 7’7 wingspan allows him to snag balls out of position, for both rebounds and lobs. His vertical talent has been a huge asset for Indiana, and will continue to hold significant value in the NBA, where vertical spacing is essential on both ends of the floor.

Ware produces solid elevation on both single and two-legged takeoffs. Single-leg takeoffs extend his dunking range from outside the restricted area, while two-legged lead to strong putbacks and contested rebounds. It also enables Ware’s mobility as a rim protector, particularly from weakside.

Cognitive and technical agility are the two building blocks of great defensive players. Cognitive agility describes ones anticipation, pattern recognition, court awareness/mapping, while technical agility describes ones footwork, posture, and adjustment speed. Ware’s application of both cognitive and technical agility skills on defense has made him into one of the best defenders in college. He has room to improve in both, but the foundation he’s built is excellent.

Ball-handling among 7-footers is a rarity. High center of gravity, long limbs, a wide domain, there’s multitudes of variables working against exceptionally tall players. Ware falls in majority of exceptionally tall players struggling to gain consistency with their handle. Off-hand is weak, fails to maintain acceleration on drives, and the handle turns volatile through contact. Unfortunately, his handle hasn’t seriously progressed beyond two dribbles. Handling coordination lags in both hands, notably his lower body out of sync with his dribbling-arm. Often has to pick up his dribble to avoid turnovers. It can be improved, but it’s a swing-skill that’s development lies contingent on whichever organization he gets drafted to. 

For a 7-footer, Ware sits on the mobile/flexible side of the spectrum. Sound knee bend, sufficient shin angles, proficient hip/ankle mobility. In respect to his size, Ware has nice running speed, sneakingly quick in sprint. A modest running cadence, compensated by massive ground coverage per stride. His long strides optimize his court movement on both sides of the floor. Ware’s lateral mobility is maximized through long strides, as efficient, vast ground coverage simplifies his defensive tasks.

OFFENSE:

Through 21 games Ware is averaging 14.6/9.0/1.7 on 59.9% eFG. He’s Indiana’s leading rebounder and second-leading scorer by good margin. Among the fourteen B10 schools, Indiana’s adjusted offensive efficiency ranks 10th at 110.3. There’s a mix blend of issues for Indiana, one through five, and Ware’s current skillset only offers limited assistance through the teams offensive troubles.

Ware at large is a play-finisher. Meaning he’s reliant on others, primarily his backcourt, to organize and initiate opportunities for him to score. Indiana’s guards, while talented, struggle significantly at the PnR. At an abysmal 0.665 PPP, Indiana ranks 327th out of all 362 D1 programs in “PnR ball–handler” efficiency. It’s the worst in their conference. Consequently, PnR volume for Indiana sits below average, stifling Ware’s scoring windows.

As guard-dependent as Ware will be offensively, the refinement of his soft skills are critical to his success. Screening, rolling, boxing out, rebounding, off-ball movement, all “small” details that add up to becoming an impactful center. 

Ware has improved immensely as a screener in contrast to his previous season, with Oregon. Establishes an effective base with precise timing on traditional ball-screens, capturing the POA off-kilter while freeing up the ball-handler. While Indiana guards have failed to capitalize on these advantages, the process from Ware is great nonetheless. Slip screens have also become a strength for Ware. He’s swift to the basket off the tag, quickly transforming the possession into a lob and dunk. The ease in which Ware can play above the rim makes entry passes easier on behalf of the ball-handler. 

Currently, the core of Ware’s scoring comes from post-ups. Against certain matchups, Ware has been dominant in the post, while against others, it’s been a complete failure. Back-to-the-basket scoring requires either strength or borderline elite shooting touch, and Ware’s proficiency in both is subpar. Stout college bigs like Zach Edey, Hunter Dickinson, or even Donovan Clingan, Ware repeatedly fails to establish favorable positioning in the post. From entry pass to shot attempt he’s imbalanced, deferring to tough turn around fadeaways when all else fails. Without post-ups, Ware’s scoring has taken dramatic declines. Again, the Ware PnR is an uncommon occurrence in the Indiana offense.

The lackluster production from the post, compounded with a shaky, untrustworthy handle, leaves little belief that Ware will become a reliable shot-creating big. Compared to Evan Mobley/Chet Holmgren, two pre-draft prospects that had good to great efficiency on midrange jumpers while in college, Ware has neither the volume or efficiency. Through natural development Ware will expand his skillset in the NBA, but likely through the path as a play-finisher. Not dribble-drives into pull up middies/hook-shots.

Difficulties arise for Ware in the high PnR, when he’s receiving the ball at the elbow/high post. With limited handling/shooting skills, it’s an area he’s uncomfortable in. In an NBA setting, with increased spacing, it’s critical Ware builds a functional handle.

On low volume (28 total attempts), has become a serious perimeter scoring threat this season. Shooting 46.8% 3pt on C&S, he’s cashed in on bigs leaving him uncontested. Above 40% 3pt shooting will be tough to sustain on higher volume, but the possibility of reliable shooting from Ware adds needed versatility in his offensive game. The shooting development is nowhere near the point of Ware taking off the dribble jumpers, but he has flashed a few turnaround jumpers in the low post.

This season he’s improved his FTr (Free-Throw rate), from 0.355 to 0.451. Ware draws a ton of contact on post-ups/put backs. When he has/creates an advantage in the post, Ware loves to draw the extra contact to garner the shooting foul. At times the foul draw comes at the cost of actually making the basket, but the process is excellent nonetheless. 

The FT shooting itself however, is still a work in progress. He’s shooting slightly under 70% on 4.4 attempts per game, at 68.8% FT. For someone as active in the paint as Ware, FTs are inevitable. Finding consistency from the line is the most important aspect of his shooting development.

Rebounding has become a much bigger focus for Ware this season, taking a huge jump up from 4.1 rebounds last season, to 9.0 this season. Through 22 games, Ware has ten double-doubles this season, in contrast to a whopping zero last season with Oregon. As rebounding becomes a larger focus in his game, he’s been gifted with easier openings to score than ever. He’s 89th percentile on putback efficiency, on nearly two possessions per game. He also has an astonishing 40% foul-rate on putbacks. The NBA loves players who can provide extra possessions off the glass. Ware does a good job finding his man, establishing position, and boxing out. His length and catch radius give him the edge nearly every time.

Rim finishing has also been a noticeable improvement from Ware this season, specifically his layups. Most of his layups come out the post, as he’s dunking the ball in almost any other circumstance. Ignoring some of the technical deficiencies in his post game (foot work, handle), Ware has acquired some really solid touch around the rim. He doesn’t have the softest touch finishing through contact/off-balance, but cognizant of that, Ware utilizes the backboard when needed. More impressively, Ware makes incredible in-air adjustments, capitalizing on his length/athleticism. The ingenuity and willingness to score in unconventional fashion around the rim should pay its dividends once his strength emerges.

DEFENSE:

Ware really comes into his own on defense. It’s where he’s dominated all season long with Indiana. The blend of length, athleticism, and technique, all come together to create an elite defensive anchor. 

As an on-ball defender, Ware has shown the capacity to defend out on the perimeter in spurts. However, Ware’s quite susceptible to stutter rips/shot fakes, frequently getting blown by on drives. He can recover for blocks, but that will become increasingly difficult to do in the pacing/spacing of the NBA. On the occasions Ware does exhibit the discipline to stand pat, he does a great job using his body and arms to keep ball-handlers uncomfortable. Laterally he’s not intuitive to the point of beating drivers to a spot, although, he does apply ball pressure that makes scoring progressively arduous. He contests very well on three-pointers, yet no blocks to date. The NBA’s elite shot-creators hunt for mismatches. Those mismatches typically involve drawing the big out to the perimeter. Ware has the defensive talent to hunker down in those possessions, but it requires discipline.

Impressively, Ware has been a good post-up defender this season. Very physical, contests well, stands his ground. Most distinctively, Ware his given Purdue senior, former POY, and arguably best post-up big in the country, Zach Edey, a ton of issues in the post. In both their matchups 7’4, 285-lbs Edey has had his worst statistical performances, shooting below 50% fg in both games. Ware becomes very active and physical on entry denials, taking the post-scorer out of position, creating disruption. 

His frame indicates a propensity to get pushed around in the paint. Ware however, walls up and contests quite well through shoulder bumps. Ware’s activity is generally a positive, but can be overly active, falling victim to shot-fakes, drop steps, and quick spins.

In the PnR, Ware has excelled in the role of anchor/rim deterrent. He primarily operates out of drop, at times deep drop, stifling roll actions while limiting dribble penetration from the ball handler. Ware does a good job making the proper adjustments/rotations on the fly, an essential quality as a drop big when you’re sacrificing proximity for rim protection. Ware has to be quick to close space to contest pull-up middies/floaters, while also ensuring he’s not giving up passing windows for a lob. It’s a difficult role, for what is essentially guarding two people at once. But his length and athleticism make it a possibility. 

Ware isn’t restricted to drop, he can and has play a myriad of other coverages against the PnR. His greatest strength is his rim protection. Utilizing him in drop is the best way to enhance said strength.

He’s averaging 1.5 blocks and 0.6 this season, a tad improvement from last season. Not particularly standout numbers from the 7’0 big. His block/steal rate is relatively low to expectations. In fact, Ware’s block rate has taken a decline this season, from 8.8% with Oregon, to 5.2% now. For context, Donovan Clingan, UConn’s 7’0 sophomore big, and fellow 2024 draft prospect, is averaging 2.3 blocks per game this season with an 11.6% block rate. Baylor freshmen big and 2024 draft prospect, Yvess Missi, also has a higher counting stat and block rate than Ware.

There’s three contributing factors to Ware’s seemingly low block numbers. The first is his established reputation as a defender. While only a sophomore, opposing teams actively avoid attacking Ware while he’s in the paint. Guards aren’t challenging Ware straight up in the paint, and even on the occasions where he’s a step behind, guards remain wary. If Ware is sitting weakside his presence is felt, and more than likely the drive results in a kickout/shovel pass to a cutter. His reputation and authority over the rim makes it harder to stack up blocks when so few attempts are made.

The second factor is his activity outside the restricted area. Ware isn’t particularly active as a help-defender when offenses pull him outside the restricted area. In comparison to the great-to-elite defensive playmakers, Ware isn’t as willing to go off-script to make a play. So while he isn’t necessarily doing anything wrong, he isn’t taking the risk nor initiative to constantly create plays on the defensive end. 

The third, and arguably most important factor, is his technique. Steals and blocks are a matter of consistently threading the needle. The difference between a potential foul and steal/block is a split second. Timing is everything. For Ware, he finds himself that split second slower than required to get blocks, especially as he’s contesting jumpers/floaters. It starts with his footwork and his arm placement. Against shooters, Ware targets the release point of the shot, lowering the apex of his arm just above the shooter's head. To Juxtapose, Donovan Clingan extends his arm nearly straight up, challenging shooters to arch their jumper above his extended fingertips. Similar wingspans, but Clingan notches more blocks.

ARCHETYPE:

6’9 (204-lbs)

2005(18/yo)

The 3&D wing archetype has become a staple in today’s NBA. The pairing of 3-point shooting wings and heliocentric ball-handlers has maximized player gravity and spacing in the most efficient manner possible. As such, 3&D wings come at a premium in the trade market. Thus, teams have looked to the draft to acquire 3&D talent.

At 6'9" and 204-lbs, 18-year-old French prospect Zaccharie Risacher projects as an efficient, impactful 3&D wing. In recent drafts, teams have been very bullish on the tall-shooter prototype, such as Jabari Smith Jr, Brandon Miller, Trey Murphy, and Taylor Hendricks, to name a few. Even with these recent additions to the league, it remains rare to find elite shooters at Risacher’s size.

Risacher is playing overseas in the LNB (French basketball league), the same league where #1 overall pick Victor Wembanyama and #7 overall pick Bilal Coulibaly of the 2023 NBA draft played before entering the NBA. While the LNB isn’t the pinnacle of overseas basketball competition, there shouldn't be significant concerns about Risacher’s performances translating to the NBA. Both Wembanyama and Coulibaly have played very well in relation to their pre-draft expectations.

PROFILE:

At 204 lbs, Risacher is on the thinner side of 6'9" physiques. A dominant physique isn’t necessary for Risacher, as his shot profile resembles that of a spot-up shooter. His overall agility, balance, and resilience when attacking closeouts are more contingent on his success than additional body mass. Defenses will eventually scheme Risacher off the perimeter, forcing him to create off-the-dribble. When catching the ball, Risacher does a sufficient job meeting it. This creates a head start in momentum downhill versus his defender, making up for lackluster straight-line speed.

Risacher plays with a high center of gravity, resulting in inconsistency in rim-finishing and ball security. Generally, there are no issues dribbling east-west; he prefers to create space off the dribble with side-steps. However, north-south, downhill, is where Risacher struggles. His dribbles come up to his waist, making it easy for help-side defenders to dig and poke the ball. He cannot maintain his handle when off-balance or when met with physical defenders. While his handle, in the context of other 18-year-old 6'9" wings, is above average, it is not to be trusted at an NBA level.

Athletically, Risacher is an average prospect. His burst, speed, horizontal/vertical strength, stability, mobility, and agility all level around the average in the NBA context. Risacher's offensive advantage creation will derive from his outlier shot-making and, potentially, crafty ball manipulation, rather than from outlier physical talents like Ja Morant's speed or Giannis' strength.

The natural scoring progression for elite spot-up wings involves generating buckets on the interior by way of attacking closeouts. It's important that Risacher develops both his technical and physical abilities to achieve this consistently in the future.

Risacher is on the thin side of wing-frames, but this isn’t an area of concern. Adding significant body weight isn’t a focus; a 10 to 20-pound weight gain comes natural for players with time. Although 6'9", Risacher’s playstyle as a spot-up shooter doesn’t encourage significant body changes anyway. Rarely will he need to utilize strength to create scoring windows (e.g., post-ups), and his finishing under the rim is more correlated to touch and technique rather than raw strength (Chet Holmgren is one of the more efficient rim-finishers from college to the NBA despite a distinctively thin frame). 

Lengthwise, Risacher has a 6’10 wingspan, considered neutral for his height. Without a length advantage, Risacher must leverage precise technique and timing to create plays on both sides of the floor. The only times his length may become a noticeable handicap are during put-backs and standing dunks.

OFFENSE:

As of January, Risacher is averaging 11.7 points per game, shooting 52.7% from the field, and an astonishing 49.6% from three on over 110 attempts. He’s JL Bourg’s second-leading scorer, only 0.2 behind 1st (11.9 pts).

JL Bourg exploits defensive tendencies by utilizing Risacher on the weak side, taking advantage of defensive sagging against high PnRs. A simple skip pass to an open Risacher has been easy points for his team for what feels like every attempt. He’s shooting 50% 3pt on C&S.

Risacher can scale the speed of his release when needed, does not rely on a heavy gather in his shot prep. Unwavering shot discipline, not fazed by teeming defenders. Also not afraid to a dribble or two off the catch for a relocation three.

Strong off-ball floor perceptivity. Knows where to be relative to the ball-handler. Maintains floor-spacing while actively creating easier passing windows for the ball-handler to kick out to.

He’s shooting 47.6% 3pt off-the-dribble, on significantly lower volume than his C&S attempts (71 less attempts to be exact). Not too much can be said about the shot type with such low volume. He’s cashed in a few impressive stepback threes, while also having a few brutal misses. Nonetheless, Risacher is undoubtedly more comfortable shooting C&S than off-the-dribble.

Solid process attacking closeouts, but technique requires improvement. Off the catch, Risacher prefers to utilize subtle rocker steps or side-steps over shot fakes to create an advantage. He isn’t exceedingly quick laterally, periodically allowing his defender to recover in doing so. In the paint, he doesn’t force rim attacks. If the big helps over to contest, Risacher will quickly transition into a floater. He’s converting 40% on floaters, which is above average among prospects his age. Impressive, relative to his height. 

Risacher, however, is finding trouble against contact. He’s not a good absorber, nor does he currently possess the craft to slip around defenders without turning the ball over. 

Risacher struggles organizing as a ball-handler, especially when leaping. He predominantly opts for a "two-foot" jumping style. In situations where a single-leg takeoff would be more appropriate, he uses two, and conversely, in scenarios suited for a double-leg takeoff, he uses one. This awkward leaping style in traffic results in a low vertical and poor rim finishing.

While in the air, his arms tend to flail after release, indicating limited core strength. At first glance, it may seem that Risacher has poor touch, but it's more likely that his lack of physical strength is inhibiting him from finding consistency around the rim, especially through defenders.

There's much left to the imagination regarding Risacher as a playmaker. In 34 games, he has 36 assists and 53 turnovers, resulting in a negative assist-to-turnover ratio both in the halfcourt and transition. He excels at making plays from the middle of the floor, specifically the nail, delivering passes to baseline cutters or open shooters on the wing, even in tight windows. These passes are expected to improve with enhanced spacing and year-over-year development as a driver.

When operating from the wing, Risacher is more prone to committing turnovers than producing assists. His skip and swing passes are often slow and generally inaccurate, easily telegraphed by defenders. While he enjoys making flashy plays for others, he lacks the ball-handling facility to consistently execute these plays.

Majority of Risacher’s turnovers stem from poor ball-handling mechanics. Loses the ball easily through contact, dribbles up to his waist at times. Doesn’t cover much ground going northeast/northwest (euro-steps), either runs into the defender or loses handle.

Risacher can be an elite spot-up shooter in the league. Footwork must be cleaned up to improve effectiveness off the dribble, and the handle must mature to sustain offensive value when defenses run him off the line. Almost a 50% 3pt shooter on over 110 attempts. 6 '9 in a professional league at 18 years old. The perimeter shooting is unequivocal. 

DEFENSE:

Risacher is averaging a single steal and 0.4 blocks through 34 games. Not standout numbers, but good to see production, nonetheless. Regardless of the numbers, Risacher has incredibly precise timing when contesting jumpers or layups off drives. Blocks come infrequently but he’s forcing tough shots. Impressive reactive skills one-on-one.

Risacher isn't a particularly active defender; he fulfills his role and quickly transitions to the next possession. True 3&D archetypes tend to be more proactive, both on and off the ball, with their impact reflected in statistical indicators like steal, block, or defensive rebound rates. NBA examples include Tari Eason, OG Anunoby, and Alex Caruso. Risacher lacks these statistical indicators, suggesting that he doesn't fit the mold of that type of wing defender. His defensive impact is more likely to manifest on a team basis rather than individually.

On-ball, Risacher consistently fulfills his role and responsibilities. He contests well against catch-and-shoot scenarios, keeping his hands high and avoiding fouling the shooter. His recovery is effective when there's no screen. However, his closeout technique needs refinement, with occasional haphazard footwork that leads to overcommitting on three-point contests, leaving an open lane to the basket. This issue appears to be a straightforward fix under NBA coaching staff. Notably, when under control, Risacher demonstrates excellent deceleration skills, making him a strong matchup against ball-handlers who play with pace and showcasing the ability to stop and go on a dime.

While Risacher has done an incredible job flipping his hips to track left-right drives, his lateral movement is noticeably weak. There's minimal ground coverage generated from his lateral shuffles, and he tends to quickly defer to running instead. Without tremendous burst, transitioning from a defensive stance to a sprint while staying at least hip level to the defender proves to be remarkably difficult.

The PnR has been Risacher’s great weakness defensively. He struggles to navigate screens effectively, often failing to get skinny to go over the top. While he would prefer to go under, the Bourg defensive scheme requires otherwise. Risacher's liability as a PnR defender hasn't significantly impacted JL Bourg's overall defense, as their frontcourt has done an impeccable job forcing turnovers and difficult shots on the interior. With a change in technique, he's likely to improve. However, NBA teams may attempt to exploit this weakness by targeting him in the PnR with their star scorers until improvements are made.

Unsurprisingly, Risacher's lack of strength renders him ineffective against big wings/bigs in the paint, particularly in post-up situations. He struggles to absorb shoulder contact, making it challenging for him to grab contested defensive rebounds. Additionally, he lacks the reactive strength and length required to effectively contest at the rim with standing vertical jumps.

Bogdan Bogdanovic is the first wing that comes to mind when I think of ~6’9 wings that shoot at an elite level, but their size has little to no value defensively. Bogdanovic is 34 in his 10th NBA season, starting, and averaging 20 points per game. While it’s disappointing that Risacher’s size more than likely has zero impact defensively, there’s still clear upside and long-term value for him in the league. His defensive drawbacks shouldn't be a deal-breaker.

Off-ball, Risacher isn’t a playmaker, but he is active when needed. He's not aggressive in passing lanes, and he doesn’t straddle between sagging off and playing up; he sticks to one and plays his role. He's a disciplined defender who doesn't get backdoored due to heavy ball-watching. Risacher knows where to be on the floor, when to switch, and when not to switch. Fundamentally, he understands the operation of whatever defensive scheme he's in. He is not inept, and that's significant.

After another horrific losing season from the Rockets, General Manager Rafael Stone has finally pivoted toward constructing a winning-conducive organization, beginning with his coaching staff. After three tumultuous seasons, Head Coach Stephen Silas was fired this past season, marking what many considered a turning point for the team. After considering many nominees, former Celtics Head Coach Ime Udoka was selected to replace Silas. Udoka was described as a tough, blunt, yet relatable coach. The defensive intellect and interpersonal skills shown in Boston were very attractive to Stone and the Rockets.

However, a Head Coach isn't the only thing Stone changed. The remaining coaching staff was effectively cleared out, allowing Udoka to hire those he believed aligned with his vision. Players were also moved during the offseason. Out of last season's 15-man roster, only seven remain. KJ Martin, Tyty Washington, Usman Garuba, and Josh Christopher were all players drafted by Stone in the last three years. All were traded away. Udoka and Stone both agreed that in order to achieve their goal of a winning season, room needed to be made on the roster to add veteran pieces. With the removal of said young talent, Stone was able to acquire Jeff Green, Dillon Brooks, Jock Landale, Aaron Holiday, and Fred VanVleet in free agency. All are older players with some level of playoff experience.

Stone wasn't done. The Rockets had the opportunity to acquire two new prospects in the 2023 draft, in the hopes of aligning their talents with the existing young core. On June 22nd, Stone drafted point guard Amen Thompson with the 4th pick, and small forward Cam Whitmore with the 20th pick. The front office, players, and fans alike were very excited to have these guys added to the roster. So now the question is, how will they be used this season in an already crowded rotation?

Amen Thompson

Amen Thompson's role seems to be more straightforward than Whitmore's. With the departure of Daishen Nix and Tyty Washington, the Rockets had an open vacancy at backup point guard that Amen Thompson will immediately fill, from day one. Throughout last season, it became clear that Kevin Porter Jr. was no longer a viable option as a franchise point guard. Acquiring a point guard of the future in the off-season became the goal for Houston. By drafting Amen Thompson and signing Fred VanVleet, the Rockets finally have a true initiator in the backcourt. While VanVleet is starting, Thompson will have the task of leading the secondary rotations.

The most important elements of Thompson's role as the primary ball-handler are his assists, turnovers, perimeter defense, and impact in transition. While there's obviously an expectation for him to score, that's not how he leads this team, unlike Jalen Green. After ranking dead last in assists and potential assists, the Rockets desperately need Thompson's passing talent. His ability to facilitate and create open shots can completely transform Houston's offense, even if he's on rotation minutes. With assists come turnovers. It's a lot to ask a rookie to avoid significant turnovers, but it doesn't hurt to ask. Thompson will naturally make mistakes. There will be moments when he gets outplayed and baited. However, the expectation of intentionality remains. Not being careless with the ball, passing with purpose, and taking what the defense gives will all help Thompson keep the turnovers down. Questions remain about his handle, as Thompson was fairly vulnerable to steals and loose dribbles at OTE. There will certainly be turnovers in that aspect.

The Rockets also ranked dead last in transition. Although often overlooked in terms of value, Amen Thompson is an excellent player in transition. Thompson will be expected to read the situation and execute the correct play to convert those simple open-floor opportunities. With his athleticism, Thompson will also be expected to create coast-to-coast scoring plays with sheer speed, akin to Westbrook and Morant. Capitalizing on these opportunities is critical to building a good-to-great offense. As he builds synergy with his teammates, this area should improve exponentially.

Expectations aren't high for Thompson as a scorer, but his capacity as a pick-and-roll ball-handler will be closely monitored. Not only will his scoring ability be evaluated, but also his playmaking. Alongside another talented creator in Alperen Sengun, the relationship they have on the floor is incredibly intriguing. Sengun doesn't provide the vertical spacing that's typically there for helio-tilted guards like Amen (Harden/Trae/Luka), but that shouldn't stop the two from being a deadly duo. A big critique of Kevin Porter Jr throughout last season was the lack of passing in the pick-and-roll, especially as defenses were icing and hard hedging ball screens. That shouldn't be an issue with Amen.

Defensively, there isn't much expectation on Thompson to produce because he's a rookie, but effort is definitely something everyone is looking for. The Rockets last season not only had a poor defensive scheme, but the effort was rarely there. Even if Thompson struggles with screen navigation and rotations, as long as the effort is there, people know that he's willing to put in the work to improve.

Cam Whitmore

Whitmore's role within the rotation this season remains unclear. Excluding Whitmore and presumably Kevin Porter Jr., there are still eight players definitively playing minutes. Teams can run nine-man rotations, but rarely does the ninth man receive significant minutes. Coach Udoka is also known for running a relatively tight ship. In the hypothetical scenario where he does earn a chunk of minutes this season, the Rockets would love for Whitmore to mirror KJ Martin's shot profile from last season.

Pre-draft, there were concerns about Whitmore's tunnel vision and shot selection. As the ninth man in the rotation, there won't be many on-ball reps for Whitmore outside of garbage time. His role will transition from being a secondary ball-handler to an athletic play-finisher. As an athletic finisher, Whitmore will primarily be scoring from cuts and spot-ups. It's simple stuff but integral to an offense. With his speed and vertical talent, Whitmore should have little issue attacking closeouts and, at the very least, drawing fouls. The biggest difference skill-wise between KJ Martin and Whitmore is their handle. While a tad shaky, Whitmore's handle is much better than Martin's, allowing for further maneuverability and versatility as a scorer. With Sengun, VanVleet, or Thompson as primary and secondary creators, Whitmore's responsibility is to get open. He's already shown he's more than capable as a cutter at Villanova and a very strong shooter off the catch as well. An efficient, low-usage, complimentary role is the most fans should expect from Whitmore this season. To make this possible, chemistry with Sengun is essential. Sengun does a terrific job of creating easy and simple looks for the wings from wherever. Whitmore has to allow his teammates to create for him.

If Whitmore does go to the G-League, it's very important that his playstyle aligns with his role with the Rockets. The Rockets in the past few seasons have not done a good job of creating a developmental environment for young players who were sent down to the G-League. For example, Josh Christopher and Tyty Washington were the primary creators and facilitators throughout their G-League tenure, meaning the offense was structured around them. At no point did they develop away from the ball as complimentary pieces. The stat sheet looked amazing, but the production was isolated to the G-League. With the Rockets, they were the 4th and 5th options at best. Christopher's inability to operate off the ball was a big reason why he was eventually traded this offseason. So for Whitmore, it's important that his time in the G-League aligns somewhat with his projected role on the team. Of course, he'll get on-ball reps, but it shouldn't be the Whitmore show.

Senior Coleman Hawkins is a 6’10, 225-lb wing with promising playmaking and defensive talent. After withdrawing his name from the 2023 NBA Draft, Hawkins has given himself another chance to improve his draft stock. There are plethora of areas he must improve in, but the talent is undeniably there.

Athleticism:

Athletically, there are a plethora of concerns around his capabilities, both in talent and forward development. Starting with his strength, Hawkins should be significantly stronger functionally than he really is. Defensively, he fails to hold his own in the paint against post-ups and short drives. Seldom does he box out, although Hawkins does well in providing second chance points for Illinois. Offensively, Hawkins struggles to utilize his 225-lbs frame to create advantages on-ball, specifically as he’s getting downhill. He’s not the player to embrace frequent contact, opting for fadeaway/pull-up mid-range shots instead of driving to the rim. The unwillingness to get his hands dirty in the paint to at the very least draw fouls is more concerning regarding his actual strength. Hawkins' style of play doesn’t align with that of a power player.

The strength concerns grow for Hawkins, as there’s no other athletic talent that he could tap into at this point. Hawkins possesses average collegiate speed for a wing, average burst, average agility, and average flexibility. As a 21-year-old wing without meaningful athletic traits, the window of getting drafted into the NBA is small.

Hawkins is an off-ball creator in the function of both scorer and playmaker, constantly looking to exploit small cracks in the defense created by his backcourt. The best off-ball players are typically some of the most athletic, as they’re able to leverage their burst and speed to create spatial advantages off the catch. Hawkins doesn’t possess the components of athleticism. He has sufficient speed in the open floor, subpar downhill momentum in the halfcourt, and a mediocre first step on both sides of the floor.

Another concern is Hawkins’ vertical talent, or lack thereof. While there isn’t an expectation of him being a primary lob threat or monster rebounder, there is an expectation that a 6’10 Power-Forward is able to rise through contact and finish around the rim, especially as a roll man and cutter.

Balance, agility, and flexibility are also concerns with Hawkins, although his mobility is substantively effective on-ball. In combination with mediocre speed and burst, Hawkins has faced challenges maintaining balance while handling the ball, often cornering himself into awkward, heavily contested shots, especially on possessions he’s looking to get downhill. Hawkins lacks rhythm and a strong base, resulting in overdribbled, slow, roundabout drives. Off-ball and defensively, Hawkins demonstrated much better balance and mobility, which alludes to his balance concerns on-ball being rooted in upper limb coordination. The lack of stability on-ball also points to subpar flexibility and range of motion in the ankle, which also impacts Hawkins’ ability to form and maintain a positive shin angle as he’s running.

As a whole, athleticism has not been a strength for Hawkins. While it’s very unlikely that he could improve on all of these issues in one off-season, enhancing his strength, stability, and range of motion functionally would pay major dividends for him this upcoming season.

Offense:

Coleman Hawkins averaged 9.9/6.3/3.0 and 2.2 stocks on 52.2% TS. While an inefficient scorer, Hawkins' role on offense stretched beyond simply scoring. He led Illinois in assists and minutes played, acting as the secondary facilitator and tertiary ball-handler for the team. Hawkins demonstrated a rather extensive passing tree for his position, with the capability of making advanced half-court reads, particularly his skip passes from the wing, which provided open looks from three for Illinois' best shooter. The intriguing aspect of Hawkins' playmaking profile is how rarely he utilized the PnR (Pick and Roll) to initiate actions. Hawkins was very comfortable making reads off-ball as a high-end connector. Going into what is expected to be the final season, Hawkins will likely continue to scale his role with more on-ball reps to take advantage of his playmaking skill. However, Hawkins' passing talent doesn't come without its fair share of turnovers. At times, Hawkins can be a bit careless with the timing and tempo of his passes, mainly due to timing issues. There are possessions where Hawkins sees a passing opportunity and calls for the ball, not understanding that the window is likely closed by the time he gets it. Instead of looking for another play, Hawkins selects to force the pass, which leads to turnovers. Hawkins had seven games with 5 turnovers or more. Alternatively, he had six games with 5 assists or more. The talent is certainly there, but Hawkins must display improved decision-making and discipline as a passer to be trusted at the next level.

As a scorer, Hawkins has an interesting shot profile. Starting with the very basics, he's attempting more jumpers than shots at the rim (layups and dunks). Per game, Hawkins attempted 4.7 jumpers and 2.5 shots at the rim. Including hook shots, Hawkins would be attempting 3.4 shots at the rim. Out of the 4.7 jumpers attempted, 4.0 were threes. There are other ≥6'10 players in the NCAA with a shot diet parallel to Hawkins, but almost none with his volume and inefficiency. He shot 29.4% on unguarded off-the-catch threes on 2.1 attempts per game. His production ranked 216th out of 223 qualified players attempting at least 2.0 off-the-catch attempts per game. Not good. Off-the-dribble, Hawkins shot 33.3% from three on 0.8 attempts per game. It's clear Hawkins isn't a strong three-point shooter, and at this point in his career, the odds of him turning into an average (36% 3pt) perimeter shooter are unlikely. As a shooter from both midrange and three, Hawkins has difficulties executing with touch and discipline. His shot quality is akin to a shooting guard, with a lot of dribble crossover pull-ups and stepbacks. This is despite having a shaky handle and poor shooting splits. Hawkins can quickly get into a rhythm of over-dribbling when he wants to shoot the ball, abandoning his passing talent and simple ball movement for contested jumpers that statistically have rarely gone in for him. It's inefficient to his game and to the Illinois offense.

The overtendency of shooting these contested jumpers has hindered his development around the rim. His efficiency at the rim is phenomenal, converting 74.4% of his layups in the halfcourt. The volume, however, is what's concerning. With his shot diet and frame, Hawkins should have a lot more than 43 total attempts at the rim. For context, 6'10 former Alabama freshman now Brooklyn Net Noah Clowney had the same three-point rate as Hawkins, attempted a field-goal and a half less per game than Hawkins, played only three more games than Hawkins, yet had 128 more total attempts at the rim. Granted, Clowney only attempted three total jumpers off the dribble, but there's a healthy in-between the two. 43 attempts are unjustifiable, especially as it's the sole shot type Hawkins was statistically efficient in.

For Hawkins to improve his efficiency, the scoring needs to become more streamlined. The biggest hindrance to Hawkins currently is his athleticism and handle. His handle is very shaky, especially on downhill possessions dribbling east-west. Hawkins has a 27% turnover rate on drives, which is very high relative to his role as an off-ball wing. An overwhelming majority of these turnovers are a byproduct of his handle. It affects his stability, speed, and passing vision. At 21 years old, prospects are no longer making substantial turnarounds in their athleticism. Refining his handle will be the big expectation this season.

Finally, the biggest factor in Hawkins making strides this upcoming season is his shot selection, notably from around the perimeter. As mentioned earlier, Hawkins is not a strong three-point shooter, but his shot profile is that of a scoring guard. Lots of step backs and off-the-dribble fades. It's over dribbling from a player that shouldn't be shooting that type of three in the first place. Becoming more streamlined in his relocation shots will have a huge effect on not only his efficiency but the team's offense as a whole.

The path is there for Hawkins to become an efficient, impactful scorer. The expectation this upcoming season is that the basic techniques like dribbling have reached a stage of on-ball functionality. This adds fluidity and much-needed ball-security to his game. It also extends his capability as a playmaker, as he delves into interior live-dribble passes. With a more compact handle, the shot selection should become increasingly precise as well. As a senior with extensive basketball experience, Hawkins knows where his strengths and weaknesses lie. It's up to him to have the discipline of choosing the right shot.

Defense:

Where Hawkins really flashed throughout the season is on the defensive end. As a Power Forward, Hawkins has a multitude of responsibilities on the defensive end, all of which are integral to the team's defensive scheme. Illinois as a whole ranked 26th in adjusted defensive efficiency among D1 schools and 5th in their conference. Illinois' success this past season was rooted in their defense, and Hawkins was a huge part of that.

Hawkins does a phenomenal job utilizing his length, both in wingspan and stride, to make up for speed and burst. He covers a ton of space with his stride movements, applying ball pressure against drives with his physical presence. There are plenty of other 6’10 forwards with 7’0 wingspans, but very few maximize their physical traits like Hawkins has.

Against spot-up shooters, Hawkins does a solid job with closeouts, generating solid contests with his lengthy arms. There are many possessions where Hawkins is technically out of position, but his daunting size and wingspan have the capability of disrupting shots regardless.

The PnR (Pick and Roll) is where Hawkins has shown the most surprising flashes defensively. Typically, big, athletically-challenged wings are the players who struggle the most to defend the PnR, whether they’re guarding as the screen-defender or ball-defender. However, Hawkins has refined his screen navigation to be more effective, no matter what the matchup is. It’s impressive how much ground he covers when coming off screens. First, Hawkins extends his arms, maintaining contact between him and his matchup. Without fouling, Hawkins manages to maintain this contact and takes a long step to get into the hip of his matchup after getting around the screen. From there, Hawkins typically plays to the hip, and that alone has been disruptive enough to create stops. Hawkins doesn’t have the hip and ankle mobility to become a primary defender against shot creators, but he does a fine job against secondary creators and play-finishers. Averaging 2.3 stocks (steals + blocks) per game, Hawkins has a talent for finding the ball at the right time. Hawkins has a ton of recovery blocks despite a weak vertical, and an incredible number of open-floor (transition) steals. When he makes the extra effort, things happen.

Where Hawkins needs to show improvement is off-ball, in the post, and around the rim as a low man. Off-ball, Hawkins simply has a discipline issue. He’s vulnerable to cuts and other aggressive off-ball scoring techniques. There were so many possessions where Hawkins allowed his man to get open lanes to the paint while playing off-ball. As a help defender on the wing, Hawkins sags way too far off his matchups. The soft doubling has largely been ineffective for Illinois, and it only makes passing easier for opponents. In the post, Hawkins lacks the lower body strength to maintain his balance and positioning when backed down. He doesn’t offer any real resistance against post moves. Around the rim, Hawkins hasn’t figured out how to vertically contest without fouling, so he defers to stationary contests. This rarely works.

In terms of draft projection, Hawkins can only go but so high as a senior. Teams, specifically playoff/contending teams, love drafting defensively tilted connective upperclassman with their 1st round picks. Hawkins’ archetype is attractive to teams who aren’t looking to develop 19 year-olds, but instead look for player to plug and play into specialized roles that can improve their team come playoff time. Christian Braun is an example of this. If Hawkins can demonstrate efficiency in his role, a first round draft selection is in his future.

Junior Kobe Johnson is a 6’6, 200-lb wing with promising two-way talent. With a stacked recruiting class, all eyes will be on USC this season. He was already impressive last season, but this year he’ll have the chance to build on his achievements in front of a much bigger stage.

Offense:

Kobe Johnson averaged 9.2/5.0/2.6 and 2.6 stocks on 59.2% TS, and 53.9% eFG. He was an efficient and productive role player for the minutes and shot attempts available. Johnson posted a season-high against Washington, scoring 21 points on 5-7 fg and 9-9 ft. Watching the Washington game alone, the off-ball versatility from Johnson is undeniable. The entire floor is his canvas, discovering pockets in the defense to exploit and create simple offense. Whether it’s cutting to the basket, relocating for an open three, or running to the ball to alleviate pressure from a teammate, Johnson’s capable.

Offensively, Johnson is an off-the-catch creator. Over 70% of his shot diet derives from shots at the rim or threes off-the-catch. He shot 38.4% 3pt on 2.2 attempts on off-the-catch threes, and 62.8% on layups in the halfcourt. He has good touch on his floaters, and works his way around through contact downhill fairly well. He struggles with some angles along the baseline, and lacks the power to consistently finish through bigs in the restricted area, but is largely efficient nonetheless. 

One of Johnson’s best qualities is his hustle factor. He has a knack for creating second chance opportunities for his team, and in a setting like the NCAA, possessions are more valuable than ever. His motor and effort is on a level that’s difficult to teach. It’s an intangible quality, a form of leadership that every NBA team values.

While the current stage of Johnson’s scoring creation is adequate, what makes Johnson so intriguing is his playmaking and projection as an on-ball scorer. Johnson had his fair share of on-ball reps, mainly PnR. The production was disappointing, putting up 0.607 PPP (points per possession) as the PnR ball-handler. He was a poor off-the-dribble shooter, converting a dismal 1-13 (7.7%) 3pt and 3-9 (33.3%) 2pt. Even going back to his previous seasons, Johnson has never been a strong, or at the very least average otd shooter. His high center of gravity and lack of burst means Johnson fails to develop any material advantage creation on-ball. He’s still relatively successful downhill, but it’s likely Johnson never establishes a reliable jumper as a ball-handler. Despite these issues, what makes folks optimistic about his on-ball development is his passing and playmaking talent. As a connector, Johnson’s responsible for identifying where the advantage is, and getting the ball to that spot in a quick yet effective manner. Johnson can make it as flashy as a behind-the-back no-look pass to the corner shooter, or as simple as sending the ball back to the top of the key in transition for an open three. He’s fleshed out his passing tree, capable of passing nearly everywhere from anywhere. He has advanced advantage perception as a playmaker (respective to his role), recognizing when his teammate has the better look than himself. The playmaking talent isn’t enough to scale him into becoming a primary or secondary offensive weapon in the future, but he will be a very effective role player. The more players on the floor that can pass, the better a teams offense runs.

Defense:

Johnson has great talent as a defender. He has great instincts, capable of anticipating a myriad of passes. It’s led him to producing strong closeouts on shooters and a ton of steals in the paint and through passing lanes. He can sag off pretty deep against shooters on the weak side without failing to recover and contest. His footwork and court awareness blend together to create a great off-ball and team defender.

Where Johnson has struggled the most is in the PnR. His lateral burst is mediocre, which leads to difficulties against smaller guards and speedy wings. Johnson tends to defend with an upright stance, resulting in a high center of gravity. With a high center of gravity, his agility and burst slows against screens particularly off-the-catch. As a last ditch effort, Johnson has a habit of gambling for steals from behind instead of looking to recover. This happens a lot from the top of the key, giving the ball-handler an unfettered lane to the basket.

While he struggles against screens, Johnson’s a positive defender in isolation, containing ball-handlers at an impressive rate. He continues to struggle with speedy guards, but defenders who can seal off speed are incredibly rare. Downhill, Johnson does a solid job tracking and walling up against his matchup, applying pressure on the ball without fouling. In the paint, Johnson is a disruptor, especially as a post-defender. His instincts make up for his lack of size, nabbing steals at every opportunity available. 

Johnson averaged 2.1 steals per game last season, posting an incredible 4.4% steal rate. Johnson’s a versatile defensive playmaker on the ground, frequently creating transition opportunities. He’s active in passing lanes, disrupts entry passes, and takes advantage of lackadaisical rebounders. His engagement and focus at every moment is  valuable, and shouldn’t go unnoticed.

Athleticism:

Kobe Johnson is an average to good athlete. Nothing that stands out, but it’s enough to get the job done. 

He generates adequate power downhill in respect to his height/weight, but he’s not a strength creator. Johnson can finish over similar-sized wings and guards, but he isn’t one to power through bigs and larger forwards for tough finishes. He can create separation with shoulder bumps in the post, but isn’t capable of backing down defenders into the paint. Defensively he holds his own very well, even against taller and bigger wings. He’s quite sturdy against post-players.

Johnson’s speed and burst are negligible. He fails to create meaningful separation with his first step, and his downhill speed is slow to the point that defenders can recover, even when beat off-the-catch. Thus, many of Johnson’s drives are roundabout, making it tough to create penetration in iso possessions. On breakaway opportunities, Johnson’s speed is once again a liability, with many of his layups getting blocked from behind by recovering defenders. Defensively, Johnson doesn’t have strong lateral agility around screens, but is generally positive in iso/post possessions. He isn’t vertically gifted either, but his agility in the paint has earned him a few blocks and steals. There’s questions around Johnson’s lower-body flexibility and mobility, as he plays mostly upright, failing to fully engage his legs both offensively and defensively. 

Overall Johnson doesn’t project to have a high ceiling, but he does project to contribute to winning system in the most productive way possible respective to his role. It’s hard to find off-ball wings with tangible playmaking talent. While the athleticism can be a concern, it’s not a weakness unique to Johnson among other rotation pieces in the NBA. His scoring ability off-the-catch in both the perimeter and at the rim will be good enough. Johnson doesn’t look to be lockdown defender like Herb Jones, but he’ll definitely be a positive contributor as an off-ball/team defender. Depending on how the season goes, Johnson could land in the first round. He has all the traits of a winning, productive player.

The 6’8, 210-lbs Duke commit will be joining a stacked recruiting class in Jarred McCain, Caleb Foster, and Seas Stewart in hopes of bring another ACC championship and possibly National championship to Durham. With the return of Jeremy Roach, Kyle Filipowski, Mark Mitchell, and Tyrese Proctor, the incoming freshmen will have to earn their minutes. TJ Power isn’t Duke’s best incoming freshman, but he may have the best chance of garnering significant minutes.

3&D wing has been the heralded archetype for nearly a decade now, and Power is another prospect that generally fits that mold. He has remarkable perimeter shot-making talent in both transition and half-court, a must-need for NBA teams today. The biggest difference however between Power and other 3&D prospects is his off-the-dribble talent. Most prospects under the archetype are limited to spot-up, off-the-catch shooting. Power however, is more than comfortable creating his own shots from three. In both EYBL and High School, Power acted as a secondary ball-handler, responsible for taking the ball up, initiating actions, and locating scoring opportunities for others. While the handle isn’t secure enough to deploy serious ball-handling duties at the college/NBA level, it’s certainly a project worth investing in. His scalability in role/usage offensively allow for flexibility between lineups and schemes.

Where Power has come up short is in the interior. Power is exceedingly jumper-reliant, preferring tough fadeaway jumpers over simple drives to the rim. It isn’t clear if he’s contact-adverse, but he certainly isn’t confident in taking the ball up strong and attacking the rim. He works well in the dunker spot, but thats one of the only spots Power makes an effort to get at the rim. His shooting touch is certainly there, but touch around the rim remains a question.

Defensively, Power flashes solid feel and instincts that accumulate to being a good defender, but he clearly lacks the biomechanics required to actually be one. Power doesn’t have the hip flexibility, lateral quickness, vertical, strength, nor burst to be a positive defender on the floor. He doesn’t cover enough ground to be a quality perimeter defender, and he doesn’t have length or physicality to be a quality low-man. He generally understands rotations and positioning, but the execution has generally been flat. His lack of burst and mediocre footwork have led to ineffective closeouts and recoveries.

Scotty Middleton

While scouts and analysts have fawned over his teammate Matas Buzelis (projected #1 overall pick by ESPN), Scotty Middleton has quietly built an impressive resume to cap off his final year before heading to Ohio State. Middleton is a talented shooting wing with eye-catching measurable’s and a promising defensive upside. At 6’6, 180-lbs, Middleton is a remarkably efficient small forward that gets to his spots with ease. His 7’0 wingspan allows him to access tight scoring windows typically reserved for taller, wings, a trait reminiscent of Mikal Bridges.

Middleton is a high-end play finisher. He ended his season at Sunrise Christian shooting 40% 3pt overall, 43% 3pt off-the-catch, and 38.5% 3pt off-the-dribble. While he doesn’t have a dribble package to be a sustainable self-creator, it is functional enough for relocation jumpers.

His main advantage as a shooter is his wingspan. With pull-up jumpers as his main offensive weapon, his 7’0 wingspan affords him the luxury of shooting above defenders, whether he has space or not. He isn’t afraid of shooting contested jumpers, both threes and middies, and he’s done it on elite efficiently in context to other high-schoolers.

Athletically Middleton doesn’t have standout foot-speed nor burst, as he runs with and without the ball fairly upright. This leads to roundabout drives to the rim and complications at the rim when met with contact. His center of gravity is to high to leverage the strength that he has to navigate through defenders, affecting not only finishing but his balance as well.

Middleton ran a fair amount of PnR, scoring a staggering 1.265 PPP (points per possession) on 34 total possessions. Middleton is solely a scorer in the PnR, rarely does he identify scoring opportunities for his teammates. He struggles toto execute live-dribble passes, and isn’t very flexible as a decision maker once he starts going.

While the shotmaking is impressive, Middleton’s potential on defense is just as fascinating. He’s lanky, but that hasn’t stopped him from being a persistent and disruptive defender. Middleton’s production as a defender overall is still raw, but he’s shown the flashes. He can cover a ton of ground with his lateral movement and length, both in isolation and pnr’s. He’s a tad slow getting to his first step when defending off-the-catch, and has a habit of biting too hard on dribble moves but the burst and speed is there. Middleton can also get caught around screens, but generally does a good job navigating through them. Additionally, Middleton isn’t afraid to get in between passing lanes and pressure in the open floor to produce steals.

Coen Carr

Coen Carr is one of the most athletically gifted prospects in this class, the type of talent that could catapult him into lottery discussions. He’s an above-the-rim force that plays with a level of pace and power that’s only replicated by few. At 6’7, 200-lbs, he provides size and flexibility NBA teams seek among wings.

Carr’s athleticism shows up everywhere in his game. He plays freely on the floor, getting to the rim from everywhere. His high-reaching vertical adds positional versatility, giving teams the flexibility to play him 2 through 4. At the 4, Carr primarily operates out the dunker spot, cutting and hunting for second chance points. His burst and speed aren’t otherworldly, it’s more than enough to generate immense rim pressure off-the-catch as well as off-the-dribble.

Carr already good command over his athleticism, utilizing his talent in a calculated matter to create clean but creative shots at the rim. As a finisher and overall shooter Carr has okay touch, but improvement is certainly needed. At the rim, he primarily goes off the glass for layups, which can get awkward when he’s along the baseline or approaching the basket at full speed. He’s a work in progress as a shooter off-the-dribble, as he has yet to find a consistent shooting rhythm and touch. Off-the-catch however, Carr shot really well. Despite this shooting inconsistency, Carr still found ways to space the floor and score the ball efficiently. He’s a great cutter and off-ball mover.

Defensively Carr is a promising prospect, applying his athleticism and frame to impose his will on matchups. He’s strong enough to push around guards and slim-framed wings, which allows him to take control of possessions as a defender. He’s a pest in isolation, staying low to the ground against even against the shiftiest of guards. He utilizes his body well against drives, avoiding the use of his arms to prevent fouling. Carr has a few blocks from the weakside, demonstrating his attentiveness, instinct, and effort on defense. To reach his full potential, Carr must improve as a perimeter defender. He’s inconsistent on closeouts and screen navigation. Nonetheless, he has the flexibility, physicality, lateral quickness, and instinct to be a great defender at the next level.