Words on AJ Dybantsa, Scoring Specialists, & the Composition of an All-Time Great
Introduction
The first observation made by the casual viewer in a basketball game is its scoring system. Dunks, threes, middies, layups—it is the indistinguishable aspect of the sport that makes it undeniably, basketball.
Those who venture beyond the casual viewing of NBA teams competing head-to-head on national tv, and into the intimate, complex, and speculative universe of player analysis, are quickly introduced to the basic quantitative measurements of the observed scoring system: field-goal percentage, three-point percentage, and free-throw percentage. These measurements are the introduction, foundation, to contextualizing player scoring performances, when one discerns Player A’s twenty points on fifteen shots is an inferior scoring performance than Player B’s twenty points on eight shots.
Those unsatisfied with basic box score analysis venture further into the depths of scoring statistics: effective field-goal percentage, contextualizing the value of a three-point to two-point field-goal that is ignored in the vanilla field-goal percentage, and true-shooting percentage, which contextualizes free-throws, specifically its value of generating points outside a possession. Both seek to better define a player’s scoring performance, offering sharper scoring analysis. These concepts remain anchored to scoring, but the value of scoring in both lies in efficiency followed by scoring volume, rather than evaluating scoring performances solely by the accumulation of points.
Beyond the advanced shooting statistics are an abstraction distantly removed from the casual viewer or the engaged fan with a league pass subscription. Beyond are advanced impact metrics, colloquially known as the spreadsheets. Following the aforementioned progression of scoring analysis, assessing players by points-per-game and/or true-shooting, impact metrics at times stand at direct contradiction. For instance, Minnesota Timberwolves shooting guard, Anthony Edwards, ranks outside the top-fifteen in multiple offensive advanced metrics; Estimated Plus-Minus (EPM), Luck-adjusted player Estimate using a Box prior Regularized ON-OFF (LEBRON). Edwards, the NBA’s third-leading scorer, averaging twenty-nine points per game, on exceeding efficiency, the head of a playoff team with multiple Western Conference Final visits, would be expected to fare much higher in a metric evaluating player impact. But unlike advanced statistics, which focus on improving the context of an individual’s scoring performance, advanced impact metrics focus on improving the context, or rather, formulating a quantified value to a player’s impact to team performance holistically. And in the context of a team, the breadth of what constitutes value expands beyond the ability to score points efficiently. Scoring’s original value is broken and distributed to passing (assists), rebounding, defense, defensive creation (steals and blocks), turnovers, fouls-drown, usage, and scoring itself is split into specific buckets: transition, halfcourt, off-ball, on-ball, and so on. Player analysis, with the summation of these values, is recentered to the examination of team success/failure when “x” player is on the floor, versus off, analyzing the dependence of team successes and failures to said player.
This concept applies to any “scoring specialist”, leading scorer or not. With an offensive profile over-leveraged in scoring, scoring specialists archetypically struggle to generate assists proportionate to their on-ball usage (scoring guards for instance), and commit a disproportionately high volume of turnovers in respect to the aforementioned usage and assists. They are inconsequential rebounders and provide nominal, if not detrimental defensive contributions to their team. Cam Thomas, 6’3 guard, waived by the injury-plagued, playoff eliminated, non-competing Milwaukee Bucks, is the poster-child of this scoring specialist archetype, for worse. Thomas averaged twenty-three points per game in the 2024 season with the Brooklyn Nets on middling efficiency, and twenty-four points per game the following season before suffering a season-ending injury with only 25 games played. Thomas was one of thirty-eight players in 2024 to average over twenty points a game, and projected to do the same in 2025. Yet, the Brooklyn Nets offered Thomas a two-year, thirty-million dollar contract, a length and figure comparable to that of an off-the-bench role player whose contract was structured for the purpose of enticing teams to engage in deadline/off-season trades. Thomas declined the offer, signed a six-million dollar qualifying offer instead in the hopes of garnering a substantially larger contract in the off-season as a free agent. Thomas was waived by the Nets by the trade deadline in February, a few days afterward signed to the Bucks, and was waived again less than 45 days of signing. While the casual fan, whose view of Cam Thomas derives from Instagram reels, Twitter media, and TikToks, infatuated by his eye-catching shotmaking talent were surprised to see these developments of Thomas—waived twice within the span of two months—those engaged with metrics would cite Thomas’ hemorrhaging defensive impact, and despite a positive offensive on-the-court, off-the-court differential, nonetheless produced a sub league-average net-rating when on the floor.
This analysis of NBA scoring specialists, and the evolution of player evaluation, is a necessary preliminary to discussing AJ Dybantsa. It is an effort to contextualize why those engaged in metrics are apprehensive of Dybantsa while those engaged to box scores and highlights project him above Cameron Boozer and Darryn Peterson.
Scoring
There are two major points to assess concerning any top-percentile scoring specialist: 1) Is their skillset a definitive ceiling-raiser in efficiency and production 2) Can their skillset compensate for poor defense, rebounding, and turnover-efficiency (if applicable).
Is Dybantsa’s skillset a definitive ceiling-raiser in efficiency and production
Given Dybantsa’s hegemony on offense—a high-volume shooter, a scoring profile predicated in on-ball actions, seldom generating offense away from the ball—one must assess Dybantsa through the lens of a high-usage, on-ball, shot-creating wing. Shot-creating wing/forwards run an inside-out shot diet, the majority of their shot volume appropriated to self-created layups, dunks, and middies, paired with moderate three-point shot volume, finished with an above league-average free-throw rate. Overall shooting efficiency generally teeters above or around league-average, and outliers such as Kawhi Leonard, LeBron James, and Kevin Durant far exceed. Dybantsa attempted 17.3 field-goals per game, thirteen of which were two-point attempts. Of his two-point makes (56.8% 2pt), 83% were unassisted. Dybantsa unequivocally meets the criteria of a shot-creating wing.
There is considerable latitude among shot-creators. A Shai Gilgeous-Alexander PnR is distinguishable from a Luka Dončić PnR, and a Paul George PnR is distinct from both. Technique and shot diet are distinct yet fundamentally every PnR style functions parallel to each other. This notion extends to the other self-creation playtypes as well, isos and post-ups. Dybantsa’s shot-creation at 6’9, 217-pounds differs to 6’3 guard prospect Darius Acuff’s despite both being high-usage prospects. Playing different positions, with differing responsibilities to their respective offenses, the two carry dissimilar criteria in maximizing possessions. For instance, as a ball-dominant 6’3 guard, Acuff is designated as the lead three-point creator to his team (e.g. Maxey, Mitchell, Brunson). Dybantsa is still expected to generate three-point volume, but not to the extent of Acuff, for it is Dybantsa’s role as a 6’9 wing to first supplement and/or reinforce his team’s two-point volume and efficiency. Shot-creation, in a word, is polytheistic. Dybantsa’s PnR shot diet is predominantly midrange jumpers, layups, and dunks, three-point attempts scarce. Supreme interior scoring talent will easily lift him above any arbitrary scoring baseline, such that three-point efficiency and the necessity to offer “spacing” as a wing is negligible. Though, at the highest level of competition, the absence of a competitive three-point shot reduces the scope of work on behalf of his opponents, and defenses will scheme against Dybantsa possessions with a concerted effort to obfuscate driving lanes in a manner that disregards the prospect of Dybantsa shooting pull-up/off-the-dribble threes. A shot-creating wing whose concurrently a top-percentile playmaker, who can punish defenses loading up strongside with passes to weakside shooters (e.g. LeBron James, Giannis Antetokounmpo) is the sole condition that allows for Dybantsa’s current status as a low-to-moderate volume, below-average efficient three-point shooter, at the highest levels.
Dybantsa’s shooting mechanics likely create the discrepancy: Upon gathering, Dybantsa builds into a deep load up, rises high, then releases his shot near equivalent to the height of the rim, shooting just above his eyes, resulting in an inconsistent and low arc. These mechanics suffice at midrange, but with increasing distances, the margin for error in mechanics increases as well, and the less he can rely solely on his shooting height and arms to make the jumper. A three-pointer simply requires more synchronous energy to execute, and it’s evident by Dybantsa’s disjointed mechanics from deep that he’s yet to find a consistent, replicable manner in which to shoot. Three-point shooting is squarely the swing skill that will separate Dybantsa from being amongst the company of great scorers to being unequivocally the best scorer in the league. Given his low three-point rate (0.245) at BYU, Dybantsa’s best path absolving his three-point conundrum is the Kawhi Leonard path—low-moderate volume, high-efficiency. Dybantsa is too dominant of an interior scorer to reduce his two-point volume and increase his three-point attempts, gambling he’ll become a league-average three-point shooter attempting upwards of eight, nine threes a game.
The fundamental advantage of a shot-creating wing is their good-to-great efficiency shooting unassisted field-goals at scale. Important, as postseason defenses in general are successful at constricting scoring in all respects, thus weakening the efficacy of spot-up shooters (who necessitate organized halfcourt structure to produce offense) that provide an essential scoring outlet to ball-handlers in the regular season. Shot-creating wings, by their ability to score out of structure independently, and offering at minimum secondary-tier assist production, present one of the best options to countering and attacking postseason-intense defenses. This illustrates the exact role best suited to maximize Dybantsa’s scoring talents.
As a dribbler, Dybantsa operates with a unique and creative rhythm—open to receive defenders, daring himself to find the wrinkle in their guard. His overall handle is footwork dependent rather than dribble work. The dribbling itself is the means to Dybantsa reaching his spots, his body—elbow, shoulder, forearm, feet—are the methods in which he actually generates space from his defender, though Dybantsa hasn’t demonstrated a particular concern for shooting whilst heavily contested.
Downhill, Dybantsa prefers to pick up his dribble early, leveraging his protracted strides and constant yet slurry pace of play to maneuver through defenders in the paint. Dybantsa loves low-gathers into a rip-through finish, adding on a euro-step to evade the rim-protector. On post-ups, Dybantsa’s sophisticated footwork shines, gathering early into his post-up to shift into his flurry of quick convincing shot fakes, baiting his defender to contest, then immediately spinning to his left into a step through and finish at the rim, again leveraging his long strides to cover at times fifteen feet of space. Some possessions Dybantsa is simply driving to the rim, the defender successfully walls up, he gathers inside the free-throw line, flashes a shot fake, baits the defender into contesting hands up and off his body, and steps through under the contest. Other possessions Dybantsa out of a post-up hop steps thirteen feet away from the basket into the paint, then once again spins left in a blur, steps through, and manufactures another bucket at the rim.
When faced against defenses who load up against him, Dybantsa is prone to over-dribbling, burning shot clock dribbling aimlessly along the top of the key looking for an approach against a set defense rather than kick it to his point guard and find a solution off-ball. Infrequently through BYU’s season did they find success with Dybantsa dribbling through the shot clock. Worse, this extensive dribbling near-exclusively ends in a shot attempt by Dybantsa, whether he was successful in identifying a worthwhile approach or not.
Playmaking
The principal objective of an offense is identifying which of the five teammates on the floor have the greatest opportunity in a possession to successfully score points. One possession it may be the lead point guard with an open pull-up three following a high ball-screen. In another possession it may be the off-ball weakside corner shooter. In another possession the rolling big.
As a team, everyone shares a varying responsibility of scoring or passing to the scorer. Assigned responsibility is determined by hierarchy: shot-creators governing, play-finishers following. It is integral to team success that the governors make use of their play-finishers, delivering the ball when their play-finishers are open, or scheming ways to get them open when hot. Logically, the leading scorer of a team, most likely the self-creating ball-handler who burns through the shot clock in their setup to score, should simultaneously be responsible for leading their team’s playmaking creation, as the ball is in their hands the most (e.g. Jayson Tatum).
Dybantsa, averaging 3.7 assists per game for BYU, is soon to become the fourth ≥6’8 freshman wing drafted first-round to average at least three assists a game, joining Ben Simmons, Paolo Banchero, and Cooper Flagg (Cameron Boozer to join this group as well). A strong positive, that in addition to a historic, record-breaking scoring season, Dybantsa demonstrated passing ability above a basic competency, joining a group of top prospects heralded for their offensive multiplicity. Of this group, including Cameron Boozer, Dybantsa leads in turnovers by significant margin: 3.4 turnovers a game by Dybantsa, Boozer in far second at 2.5 a game. An inability to contain one’s errors whilst principal of an offense’s decision making is a failure to maintain an efficient, progressive offensive process. In settings where the value of each possession rises to a peak, say, the postseason, the evidence of inefficient and regressive playstyles are underscored not only by turnovers, but the selection of shots attempted. Scoring turnovers by on-ball creators are borne either by the acuity of the defense, or the arrogance of the scorer. Arrogance is largely the cause of Dybantsa’s.
To accomplish forty-three dunks in a season with scarce off-ball input, Dybantsa was obligated to initiate rim-pressure from twenty-two feet out and beyond, continually battling through a legion of defenders on his way. Rim-pressure is a net positive: defenses in response are obligated to collapse their scheme, sending one, two, or more help defenders to contain and deter the ball-handler from meeting the rim, sacrificing scorers around the floor, typically the opposite (weakside) corner player, open. The best on-ball creators exploit this defensive routine, fulfilling the pass to the corner scorer for the open three. There may also be the low-man who’s left open at the dunker spot as his defender lifts up to contain the ball-hander, available for an alley-oop. Dybantsa largely ignored these reads, favoring the option to barrel through defenders in hopes of, at the very least, a short pull-up jumper. In response, nail defenders who dug, and help-defenders sent to double, easily picked off Dybantsa. Worse, in instances in which Dybantsa was forced to pick up his dribble mid-drive, typically stopped around the free-throw line due to the overwhelming pressure and presence of multiple defenders roaming, stifling his driving lanes, rather than pass, Dybantsa favored out-of-rhythm, fully-contested, pull-up midrange jumpers, gambling on sheer shotmaking talent alone. Yes, Dybantsa has demonstrated sporadically the capability to execute the aforementioned reads. However, the rate in which Dybantsa makes these passes relative to his arduous shot attempts is low. And unlike his predecessors, Kawhi Leonard, Kevin Durant for instance, methodical in the process by which they score, Dybantsa demonstrates a more exploratory, persistent approach, willing to extend his dribble and probe an offense unassisted akin to heliocentric guards Harden, SGA, or Luka Doncic. And without the playmaking acuity of a heliocentric guard, or the efficient processes of Leonard or Durant, Dybantsa’s shooting gambles are left exposed, absent of an alternative. The arrogance of the scorer: the concept of scoring turnovers extend beyond committing a turnover, to the forsaking of a possession entirely by the nature of one’s offensive philosophy over-leveraged in self-creation.
Dybantsa is a capable playmaker; 3.7 assists per game as a 6’9 freshman wing is an accomplishment duly worthy of commendation. The nature of Dybantsa’s turnovers, his overall offensive processes, raise questions to the measure in which his playmaking could advance: Is playmaking simply a tool of Dybantsa’s offensive arsenal, or can it transform into an additional firepower to which defenses must account for. In today’s NBA, the best of the best are concurrently top playmakers as they are scorers. Those that operate over-leveraged in one or the other expose themselves to vulnerabilities playoff defenses are quick to exploit.
Defense
Can their skillset compensate for poor defense, rebounding, and turnover-efficiency if applicable.
One must consider as the primary on-ball creator the magnitude of energy demanded to independently generate offense possession after possession, and the effect that has on one’s defensive capacity. From a general lens, the NBA’s top scorers are concurrently their team’s worst starting defender, and objectively poor defenders—a consequence partly attributed to their offensive output. SGA, Embiid, Giannis represent outliers, and were deservedly awarded MVP(s) for their exceptionality. The breakneck ascension of ‘26 unanimous DPOY Victor Wembanyama, the prospective rise of two-way ‘26 ROTY Cooper Flagg promises the establishment of two more exceptionalities, likely to be awarded Most Valuable Player in the imminent future. Dybantsa, is not a two-way phenomenon, nor an exception to the scoring specialist typecast.
Amongst his positional predecessors, Paul George, Kawhi Leonard, Kevin Durant, Jayson Tatum, Dybantsa is an outlier, failing to demonstrate promising defensive acuity and/or defense playmaking through steals, blocks. The aforementioned forwards aren’t homogenous in their defensive playstyles, but provide defensive value in some capacity to their team: Paul George’s perimeter defense; Kawhi Leonard’s POA defense; Kevin Durant’s weakside rim protection; Jayson Tatum’s versatility.
Dybantsa struggles to employ his athletic talents to defend point-of-attack (POA), in what can be considered sluggish lateral quickness by way of his elongated strides, an advantage offensively, yet prone to shifty ball-handlers capable of continuous changes of direction (crossovers, stepbacks, etc.). This extends to navigating screens, a difficulty for 6’8+ defenders across the board to maneuver. Nonetheless, it is worsened by Dybantsa’s absence of awareness, or rather, a delayed intake to the actions presented, trepidant to execute in-time decisions between sticking to the screener, re-switching, or making the extra effort to recover around the screen back to the ball-handler. These lapses in discernment expose himself and the overall defensive scheme to game-spanning vulnerabilities.
Dybantsa is a defender in attendance alone. He is not an engaged defender. Inactive as a nail defender whose role is to dig and apply supplementary pressure against the driver navigating through the lanes, inactive as a weakside rim protector, whose role it is to contest and deter attempts at the rim, conservative and switch-happy against off-ball screening actions. His footwork on closeouts is poor, approaching shooters in an semi-open stance, his feet forming an acute angle to the shooters feet, granting the shooter a lane to the basket if they choose to drive. Dybantsa’s gallant steps on closeouts do not allow Dybantsa the intervals to press close to shooters, for otherwise he’d make contact, and thus finds himself contesting shots just short of a stride away from a defender, an ineffective closeout distance against Big12 conference shooters. His weight is a mark for post-scorers, and Dybantsa as an inactive defender, isn’t looking to swipe at the ball before they take the shot.
Off-ball playmaking activity is Dybantsa’s defensive highlight, though inconsistent. Utilizing his 7’0 wingspan and long strides, Dybantsa disrupts entry, swing, pocket passes, averaging 1.1 steals per game. Within the context of his defense holistically, it holds minimal delta to his impact; nonetheless, it is the facet most likely to scale with concerted effort and refinement.
It’s difficult to envision a NBA universe in which Dybantsa doesn’t string multiple 25-point per game seasons, earn at least one scoring title, multiple All-NBA and All-Star selections, cultivating a hall-of-fame career portfolio crafted by generational scoring pressure. Though, it must be stressed that within the contemporary NBA landscape, the increasing growth and sophistication of wing-sized ball-handlers, wing-sized heliocentric engines, correspondingly demands defensive-competent sized wings to guard them. Further, the prevalence of defensive switching, the expansion in physicality to fight against switch pressure (offenses mismatch hunting), the rising demand for rim-protection against wing-sized slashers, Dybantsa plays at a position that would otherwise be primed to combat the current NBA meta.